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OUTER SPACE: HOW SHALL THE WORLD’S 
GOVERNMENTS ESTABLISH ORDER AMONG 
COMPETING INTERESTS? 
Paul B. Larsen† 
Abstract: We are in a period of transition in outer space; it is becoming 
increasingly congested. As one example, small satellites are beginning to interfere with 
astronomical observations. The objective of this article is to examine and evaluate how the 
various outer space interests interact, coordinate or conflict with each other. This article 
examines legal order options and the consequences of choosing among those options.  
Cite as: Paul B. Larsen, Outer Space: How Shall the World’s Governments Establish Order 
Among Competing Interests?, 29 WASH. INT’L L.J. 1 (2019). 
I. INTRODUCTION: WHY ORDER IN OUTER SPACE?
Outer space seems unlimited; at least it so appeared in 1957 when
Sputnik was launched. Since then, space activities have blossomed and many 
more are coming. There are now approximately 2000 functional satellites.  On 
May 23, 2019 Space-X launched a mission that placed 60 more satellites into 
low Earth orbit (“LEO”). Space X plans to launch 12,000 satellites. Blue 
Origin will launch another 4,000 satellites. One Web is launching 650 
satellites. Military planners intend to orbit hundreds of new spacecraft.1 Other 
launch operators of different nationalities have announced launch plans for 
† © Paul B. Larsen. The author taught air and space law for more than 40 years respectively at 
Southern Methodist University and at Georgetown University. He is co-author of FRANCIS LYALL AND PAUL 
B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE (Routledge, 2nd ed. 2017). and of PAUL B. LARSEN, JOSEPH SWEENEY 
& JOHN GILLICK, AVIATION LAW. CASES AND RELATED SOURCES (Martinus Nijhof, 2nd ed., 2012) (Send
comments to pblspace @aol.com).  The author thanks Professors Frances Lyall, David Koplow, Matthew
Stubbs, Saadia M. Pekkanen, Phillip Favero, and Christopher Johnson for their valuable comments
1  Sandra Erwin, As It Plans LEO Constellations, DOD Must Prepare to Deal with Congestion, 
SPACENEWS, June 10, 2019, at 30 [hereinafter LEO Constellations]. For further discussion, see generally: 
Paul B. Larsen, Space Traffic Management Standards, 83 J. AIR L. & COM. 359, 359–87 (2018) [hereinafter 
Space Traffic]; Paul B. Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, 83 J. AIR. L. & COM 475, 475–519 (2018) 
[hereinafter Solving]; Paul B. Larsen, Minimum International Norms for Managing Space Traffic, Space 
Debris and Near Earth Object Impacts, 83 J. AIR L, & CON 739, 739–785 (2019) [hereinafter Managing]; 
Paul B. Larsen, International Regulation of Near Earth Objects, 67 GER. J. AIR & SPACE L. 105, 105 (2018) 
[hereinafter Regulation]; Paul B. Larsen, Small Satellite Legal Issues, 82 J. AIR L. & COM. 275, 275–309 
(2017) [hereinafter Small Satellite]; and Paul B. Larsen, Outer Space Arms Control, Can the USA, Russia 
and China Make this Happen?, 23 J. CONFLICT AND SECURITY L. 137, 137–159 (2018) [hereinafter Arms 
Control]. 
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thousands of additional functional satellites. Many small satellites are 
destined to form large constellations.  
Space traffic congestion is a present problem and getting worse. The 
U.S. military considers outer space to be dangerously congested. The 
congestion consists not only of the large number of orbiting satellites; it 
includes more than one million pieces of uncontrolled orbiting space debris 
that must be avoided by functional satellites. Functional satellites need to be 
deorbited and replaced regularly by new satellites. Frequent launches and 
deorbits through crowded Low LEO pose another traffic problem. Satellite 
operators agree that space traffic management (“STM”) is needed.2 Removal 
of existing space debris is not yet feasible. The Kessler Syndrome looms 
unless space debris can be controlled.3 While existing COPUOS space debris 
guidelines promise to diminish the generation of new debris, that will not be 
adequate.4  More extensive debris control is needed in order to avoid the 
foreclosure of outer space. Another space traffic concern is the danger of 
losing control over orbiting satellites due to cyberattacks. Operators need to 
protect their computer systems from being hijacked by outsiders.5 
Space is legally non-sovereign.6 No one country is permitted to control 
all moving objects in outer space, because outer space cannot be appropriated 
2  LEO Constellations, supra note 1, at 30. 
3  The Kessler Syndrome predicts the foreclosure of outer space unless the current trend in space debris 
is reversed. See Donald J. Kessler & Burton G. Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The 
Creation of a Debris Belt, 83 J. J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 2637, 2637 (1978) [hereinafter Collision Frequency]. 
According to the Kessler Syndrome, space debris of critical mass will fragment in further collisions, leading 
to cascading chain activity. See Donald J. Kessler et al., The Kessler Syndrome: Implications to Future Space 
Operations, 33RD ANN. AAS GUIDANCE & CONTROL CONF., at 2 (Feb. 6–10, 2010), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.394.6767&rep=rep1&type=pdf [hereinafter 
Kessler Syndrome]. The unending fragmentation chain reaction may eventually foreclose access to outer 
space, which is a danger to all outer space activities. See Kessler Syndrome, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).      
4  See Inter-Agency Space Debris Coord. Committee, IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines 
(Sept. 2007), https://www.iadc-online.org/index.cgi?item=docs_pub [hereinafter Mitigation Guidelines]. See 
also COPUOS Space Debris Guidelines, in 3 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 605 (Stephan Hobe, 
Bernhard Schmidt-Ted, & Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds., 2013). 
5  Ingo Bauman et al., GNSS Cybersecurity Threats, An International Law Perspective, INSIDE GNSS 
MAGAZINE June 3, 2019, at 30. 
6  The relevant space law treaties include: Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer 
Space , Nov. 12, 1974, 1923 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter UN Registration Convention]; Convention on 
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter 
Liability Convention]; Agreement on Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue and Return 
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by any one state. Each state can legally only govern its own orbiting space 
objects. 7  Therefore, an internationally agreed upon legal order will be 
required to manage traffic in outer space.   
While no one can appropriate space, nevertheless there are many 
stakeholders. They compete and often conflict with each other. Each seeks to 
hold outer space open for its own legal outer space activities. This paper 
identifies the main stakeholders. How do they interact? How could they 
possibly accommodate each other to extend the uses of outer space to all 
authorized users of all nationalities?  
First, the paper considers the option of no legal order in outer space; 
activity would be on a first come, first serve basis. The second legal order is 
based on freedom of scientific investigation in outer space. A third order 
considers outer space as a global commons. A fourth is the order established 
by outer space treaties. A fifth is the order already established by the 
International Telecommunication Union for navigation of satellites by use of 
radiofrequencies. A sixth is the military order, which views outer space purely 
as a military domain. A seventh is the commercial order in outer space being 
created as thousands of small commercial satellites are launched into orbit by 
Space-X, Blue Origin, One Web and others. An eighth order is established 
through the United Nations by international codes and guidelines intended to 
enable users to accomplish their tasks and protect their investments. This 
confused situation may lead to chaos, with winners who dominate outer space 
and losers who will be pushed aside. Ultimately, the entire Earth-Space 
infrastructure needs coordinated order allowing co-existence. 
 The United Nations started us on the right path by approving the 2008 
space debris guidelines now being adopted by all the countries. However 
military engagements by China and India have already added thousands of 
debris into outer space. Moreover, the thousands of small satellites now being 
launched to improve communication and for remote sensing, when added to 
existing military debris, may eventually block access to outer space. 8 
Agreement]; and Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, July 
11, 1984, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement]. 
7  Outer Space Treaty art. VIII, supra note 6, at 209; see also Space Policy Directive-3, National Space 
Traffic Management Policy, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,969 (June 18, 2018) [hereinafter STM]; Presidential 
Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-3, National Space Traffic Management Policy (June 18, 2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/space-policy-directive-3-national-space-traffic-
management-policy/ [hereinafter Space Policy Directive–3]. 
8  Kessler Syndrome, WIKIPEDIA, supra note 3. 
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Currently outer space activities are disturbing the natural Earth-Space 
relationship.9 
II. THE OLD ORDER: GOVERNMENT DOMINATION
There are a variety of stakeholders in outer space that compete and
often conflict with each other. Each stakeholder seeks to make its own space 
activities possible. The objective of this section is to identify the main 
stakeholders to understand how they interact. 
A. Government Stakeholders
Governments were the first stakeholders. They potentially are involved
in all space activities ranging from activities in which they participatice to 
activities they merely authorize. Included are commercial satellite operators, 
surface users of satellite communication services, Global Navigation Satellite 
Services (“GNSS”), astronomers, and military satellite operators. In 1957, 
when the Russian Sputnik satellite was orbited, governments and exploring 
scientists were the main stakeholders. The governmental interest followed 
naturally from the development of military launch rockets during World War 
II by Germany. The military rockets eventually became the launch vehicles 
for satellites. The rockets were military craft and their military potential was 
their main importance to the states that operated them. Russia and the USA 
were the major stakeholder countries in 1957. 
Today some developed countries, in particular the United States, have 
a keen interest in facilitating space activities by non-governmental 
commercial operators.10 Space activities by non-governmental operators are 
growing rapidly. Most of the activities relate to commercial remote sensing 
satellites and communication satellites. The expectation is that there will be 
huge growth in small satellites active primarily in LEO. In addition to the 
United States, other countries that also authorize significant commercial space 
traffic include Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Germany and France. 
Under the Outer Space Treaty (“OST”) Art. VI, the individual countries 
are responsible for compliance of their non-governmental operators with the 
OST. Under OST Art. VII, states assume liability for all damages caused by 
9  Id. 
10  See STM, supra note 7; Space Policy Directive–3, supra note 7. 
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their military, civilian, and other non-governmental operators.11 The 1972 
Liability Convention 12  further implements the international law of state 
liability. These laws gave the governments significant stakes in all outer space 
with a consequence of minimizing governmental liability.   
Most space technology is dual use (joint commercial and military); 
there is frequent interchange of technology between military and civilian 
functions. The distinction between governmental stakes in civilian and 
military uses was made at the beginning of the space age. Governmental outer 
space activities were originally military in nature. In 1958, the United States 
separated civilian and military space activities by establishing the National 
Astronautics and Aeronautics Administration (“NASA”), responsible for 
civilian outer space activities,13 while the Department of Defense retained 
control over military activities. 
Military authorities are motivated by their interest in effective and 
successful war fighting and in military activities short of war. In 1967, at the 
time of the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty, the interest of military 
strategists was to ensure that adversaries did not gain exclusive control of 
outer space.14 Subsequent to 1957, military space technology leaped forward. 
Thus, at the present time (2019), the three major military space powers—the 
United States, Russia, and China—are actively competing with each other to 
develop their outer space military capabilities.15 They have recently been 
joined by India. Altogether, they invest increasingly in military space 
technology.16 
The United Nations is an important forum for governments to assert 
claims to authority in outer space. Non-military issues are discussed in the 
United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer (“COPUOS”). 
11  Outer Space Treaty art. III, supra note 6, at 208. 
12  Liability Convention, supra note 6; 2 COLOGNE COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 83–202; Paul B. 
Larsen, Does New Space Require New Liability Laws?, 68 GER. J. AIR & SPACE L. 196, 196 (2019). 
13  National  Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426, 426 (1958) (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2451(a) (2006)). 
14  Outer Space Treaty art. II, supra note 6, at 208 (mandating that outer space cannot become the 
sovereign territory of any one state); Outer Space Treaty, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 613. 
See generally FRANCIS LYALL AND PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE (2nd ed. 2017).  
15  See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 447–81. 
16  Jen DiMascio & Lee Hudson, A Shakeup in U.S. Military Space, Aviation and Space Technology, 
AVIATION WEEK (April 15, 2009) https://aviationweek.com/print/defense/shakeup-us-military-space. See 
also Paul B. Larsen, Outer Space Arms Control: Can USA Russia and China Make This Happen, 23 J. OF 
CONFLICT SECURITY L. 137, 137–58 (2018). 
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Multilateral military outer space claims are discussed in the UN Disarmament 
Conference which meets in Geneva, Switzerland. Claims of authority are 
similarly asserted in bilateral negotiations.17 
B. Developing Countries’ Claims to Explore and Use Outer Space
The principle of sovereign equality prevails in UN decision-making.18
The United States, China, Luxembourg, Ghana, and Cameroon each have one 
vote in UN negotiations. This parallels how COPUOS operates on the basis 
of equality of states.19 The space powers need the support of the non-space-
powers to obtain approval for their proposals.20 The developing states used 
their voting power to their advantage in the OST negotiations in 1967. They 
have continued to use this voting power to their advantage in the negotiation 
of the UN Sustainability Guidelines.21 The developing countries can benefit 
from the non-governmental space services of the space powers. Operators in 
developed countries make satellite communication, remote sensing, and 
GNSS technology available to the developing countries at a price. For 
example, the communication company One Web plans to make Internet 
connection available where it does not exist in Africa.22 However, a 2019 
conference of African states in South Africa indicated that the interest of the 
African states cannot be fully realized by private companies from the 
developed world. The African countries agreed that they must assert their 
equal rights in outer space to their advantage and must work together to 
maintain their socioeconomic interests in outer space. That requires them to 
use their voting powers in COPUOS to assert their claims to authority. To 
make effective use of their rights, these nations need technical and economic 
capabilities that they do not yet have. They can insist on receiving technology 
and economic resources by negotiating directly with the commercial 
17 Disarmament, UNITED NATIONS,  
https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpHomepages)/6A03113D1857348E80256F04006755F6 (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2019). Outer Space Treaty art. VII was negotiated in COPUOS. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra 
note 14, at 13–18. 
18  See U.N. Charter. 
19  See Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE 
AFFAIRS, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.html. See also LYALL & LARSEN, supra 
note 14, at 14–18. 
20 COPUOS makes decisions by consensus. 
21 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Draft Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Sixty-Second 
Session, Annex II, Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.105/L.318/Add.4 (2019). 
22 ONEWEB, https://www.oneweb.world/ (last visited July 15, 2019). 
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companies.23 They can also benefit from obtaining capacity building from the 
developed world through COPUOS.24 Thus, the developing countries have a 
keen  interest in the international regulation of outer space activities by 
operators from developed countries, and those interests must be 
accommodated. 
C. The Nineteen States Parties to the 1979 Moon Agreement25
The 1979 Moon Agreement repeats many of the legal principles of the
Outer Space Treaty, such as the principle that the moon and the celestial bodies 
cannot be appropriated. However, OST Article I does not include the notion 
of common exploitation of lunar resources.26 The Moon Agreement, Article 
11, pronounces that the Moon and celestial resources are the “common 
heritage of mankind.” The States Parties to the Moon Agreement are 
committed to protect this basic principle on use and exploitation of lunar and 
celestial resources.  
Several US commercial companies have recently expressed intentions 
to extract lunar mineral resources. New US law recognizes the legal right of 
commercial companies to own lunar resources as being compatible with the 
OST.27 However, the US has not joined the Moon Agreement and does not 
accept the Moon Agreement’s legal principle of the Moon being the “common 
heritage of mankind.” Claims of legal entitlement to celestial mining raise the 
question of unilateral appropriation of outer space resources. By adopting this 
new law, the US appears to claim stakes in the Moon and other celestial 
bodies. That claim differs from the claimed stakes of the 19 countries which 
are parties to the Moon Agreement. The differences go to the heart of the way 
outer space shall be regulated. Subsequently, because the technology 
23  See Peter Martinez & Ian Christensen, African Perspectives on the Space Resources Dialogue, 
SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION NEWSLETTER (Secure World Foundation, Broomfield, CO), June 5, 2019, 
info@swfound.org. 
24  Id. 
25  Moon Agreement, supra note 6. 
26  See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 59. 
27 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129 Stat. 704, 721 
(2015). Luxemburg also recognizes the legal right of commercial companies to own lunar resources. See 
Franz Schilling, Fishing in Outer Space – The Luxembourgish Interpretation of the Appropriation of in-Situ 
Resources, 68 ZLW 248, 253–60 (2019). 
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necessary for lunar mining has not yet developed, tensions between the two 
groups have abated for the moment.28 
D. The Equatorial States Parties to the 1976 Bogotá Declaration29
The OST does not define the border between air space and outer space.
Equatorial states are of the view that the geostationary orbit (“GSO”) is not 
part of outer space; they claim sovereign rights to the GSO above their 
territories. A number of equatorial states met in Bogotá, Colombia in 1976 to 
declare that the GSO above their territories is their sovereign space. By doing 
so, they claimed jurisdiction over property rights in their GSO and now 
demand that satellites in GSO orbit above their territory obtain special permits 
from the subjacent government. These equatorial states also treat the GSO as 
the border between their sovereign and non-sovereign space; all activities in 
their sovereign space would be subject to their domestic laws. This would 
limit their stake and their interest in international regulation of outer space to 
all space beyond the GSO. Their claim has not been adopted by other 
stakeholder states. 
E. International Organizations
International governmental organizations approve of the COPUOS
claim precedential jurisdiction for creating order in outer space. 30  As a 
committee of the UN General Assembly, COPUOS has a unique stake in outer 
space order as the major forum for international discussion of international 
space activities. The work of the Committee is divided between its Scientific 
and Technical Subcommittee (“STSC”) and its Legal Subcommittee (“LSC”). 
COPUOS is serviced by the United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs 
(“UNOOSA”), 31  which administers several special outer space subject 
groups. These include the United Nations Register of Objects Launched into 
Outer Space and the UN Platform for Space-Based Information for Disaster 
Management and Emergency Response (“UN-SPIDER”). UN-SPIDER in 
28 Michael Bruno, Is Space Due for Some Bootstrapping?, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY 
(Feb. 28, 2018) (report on Deep Space Industries and Planetary Resources—two companies involved in lunar 
mining); see also Brian Israel, Space Resources in the Revolutionary Course of Space Lawmaking, 113 AJIL 
UNBOUND 114, 118 (2019) (2018 COPUOS Legal Subcommittee failed to put the issue on its agenda because 
the commercial market for asteroid and lunar mining has not developed).  
29 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 160–62; 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 55. 
30 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF. (UNOOSA), 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/cpuous/index.html (last visited June 30. 2019) (reports to the Fourth 
UN Committee by COPUOS); see infra note 209. 
31  UNOOSA, http://www.unoosa.org (last visited June 20. 2019).   
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turn administers the UN Disaster Charter and serves as nerve center for 
international disaster relief.  
The International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”) is an organization 
to which virtually all the states are members.32 The ITU regulatory activities 
are authorized by the ITU Constitution33  (a treaty instrument) and by its 
administrative regulations.34 Although ITU is a specialized agency of the 
United Nations, it is governed by its separate treaty instruments.35 ITU’s claim 
to authority in outer space is founded on the need for exclusive 
radiofrequencies for guidance of satellites. Operators need to navigate their 
satellites unhindered by radio interference. The key phrase is “harmful 
interference.”36 Radio interference with a radiofrequency renders a satellite 
unnavigable and, thus, useless. The problem and its solution are spelled out in 
Art. 44 of the ITU Constitution:37 
Radio frequencies and orbits are limited natural resources and 
they shall be used rationally, efficiently and economically . . . so 
that countries or groups of countries may have equitable access 
to both taking into account the special needs of the developing 
countries and the geographic situation of particular countries. 
A plenipotentiary conference of states meets every 4 years to review 
current ITU regulation and to make fundamental changes in the treaty 
structure. Being a treaty organization, only states can become members of the 
ITU. However, being a technical organization, the ITU needs the technical 
expertise of non-governmental operators. Thus, non-governmental agencies 
and operators may become members of specialized sector activities of the 
ITU. 
32  LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 194–95. 
33  See Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU], Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, 
reprinted in COLLECTION OF THE BASIC TEXTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION 
ADOPTED BY THE PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE, http://perma.cc/WC8J-JMAX (2015) [hereinafter ITU 
Constitution]. 
34  LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 194–95. 
35  Id. 
36 ITU, RADIO REGULATIONS, art. 1.169 (2016), http://www.itu.int/pub/R-REG-RR-2016 (defining 
harmful interference as “[i]nterference which endangers the functioning of a radio navigation service or of 
other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication service 
operating in accordance with Radio Regulations (CS).”) [hereinafter RADIO REGULATIONS]; see Ingo 
Baumann, GNSS Cybersecurity Threats: An International Law Perspective, INSIDE GNSS MAG. (June 3, 
2019), https://insidegnss.com/gnss-cybersecurity-threats-an-international-law-perspective/.  
37  See ITU Constitution art. 44, supra note 33, at 49. 
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The European Space Agency (“ESA”) is an example of a regional 
governmental organization with a significant stake in organization and use of 
outer space resources. Several other international organizations also assert 
jurisdiction in outer space, including the World Meteorological Organization 
(“WMO”) and the European Organization for Meteorological Satellites 
(“EUMETSAT”).38 
F. Non-Governmental Commercial Satellite Operators
Non-governmental commercial operators have significant stakes in
regulation of outer space. Examples are INTELSAT, SES, Eutelsat, 
INMARSAT, Planet, One Web, etc. Commercial satellite operators are 
primarily motivated by profit. For their operation, they need access, 
radiofrequencies, orbital slots, and assurance that other commercial operators 
will not interfere with their radio frequencies, orbits, and conducting of 
business in outer space. Additionally, they need a secure business 
environment; space situational awareness, which requires transparency about 
other traffic as well as military traffic. They also need to know the locations 
of dangerous space debris. Finally, they may require protection from their 
governments when pressed by governmental and non-governmental operators 
from other countries. Commercial operators assert their interests through trade 
organizations and individually in dealings with each other and with 
governments. 
Non-governmental operators’ profit motivations drive them to compete 
fiercely with each other. The intensity of competition among the commercial 
satellite operators is illustrated by the recent Space-X application to the U.S. 
Federal Communication Commission (“FCC”) to relocate 1484 small 
satellites from orbits in the 690–823 mile range from Earth to lower Earth 
orbits in the 347-mile range. Several other commercial operators (Planet, 
Spire Global, Astro Digital) plan to orbit in the lower range now allocated to 
Space-X.39 Consequently, these commercial operators filed protests with the 
FCC claiming hardship resulting from the FCC decision, arguing that the 
38  Who We Are, EUMETSAT, (Nov. 17, 2019, 12:32 PM), https://www.eumetsat.int/website/home/ 
AboutUs/WhoWeAre/index.html.  
39  LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 223; see Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C § 307 (2004) 
(FCC decides whether granting an application is in the public interest); see Irene Klotz, Showdown at LEO: 
FCC Approves Lower Orbit for Space-X Satellites, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH. (May. 6, 2019), at 50 
[hereinafter Showdown] (Space-X will ultimately launch more than 12,000 satellites); see Irene Klotz, Small 
Satellites, Big Data, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH , July 30–Aug. 19, 2018, at 48, 49 [hereinafter Small 
Satellites].  
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operators of non-navigable small satellites would not be able to change orbits 
to avoid conjunctions with the mass of Space-X satellites. The recent FCC 
application by Amazon to launch 3,236 satellites will further increase the 
congestion and the competition for slots in LEO.40 Ultimately, ITU will only 
clear orbits which are free of radio interference. 41  That may be difficult 
because of the multitude of applications for radiofrequencies and related 
orbits.42  
A variety of trade associations represent non-governmental satellite 
operators. Large operators, such as INTELSAT, SES and EUTELSAT, 
operating mainly in high Earth orbits, have formed the Space Data Association 
to coordinate their common interests. 43  This association has formed 
subcommittees on traffic data sharing, safety, procedural developments, 
interference with radio frequencies, operations, flight dynamics, and 
government liaisons. Other satellite operators, receiving funding from the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”), have formed the 
Consortium for Execution of Rendevouz and Servicing Operations 
(“CONFERS”) to coordinate long term sustainability, safety, technical 
standards, and satellite flight operations. 44  The Commercial Smallsat 
Spectrum Management Association is yet another group of small satellite 
companies operating in LEO such as Planet, One Web, and Blacksky.45 This 
association represents the radio spectrum management’s interests of the small 
satellite operators in their joint dealings with the FCC and through the FCC 
with the International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”). 
There are limits to the ability of non-governmental trade associations 
to establish order in outer space. They cannot legally agree to limit 
competition among themselves.46 They may also be ineffective in regulating 
safety for themselves individually and within their trade associations because 
of overriding profit motives.47 
40  Klotz, Showdown, supra note 39, at 50; see Klotz, Small Satellites, supra note 39, at 48.  
41  See infra Part IV.E for discussion of ITU.  
42  See infra Part IV.E. 
43  Committees and Working Groups, SPACE DATA ASS’N (June 15, 2015), https://www.space-
data.org/sda/committees-and-working-groups/. 
44   CONFER, http://www.satelliteconfers.org/ (last visited June 15, 2019).  
45 CSSMA, https://cssma.space/ (last visited June 15, 2015).  
46 See infra Part IV.E for discussion of ITU. 
47 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C §§ 1–7 (2004); Boeing 737 MAX 8 disaster is example of product being 
marketed, with FAA acquiescence, before being adequately tested for safety. See Jim Hall and Peter Goetz, 
The Boeing 737 Max Crisis Is a Leadership Failure, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 17, 2019), 
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G. Manufacturers of Space Equipment
Manufacturers of satellites, launch vehicles, or outer space weaponry
who are in the business of supplying outer space equipment have a significant 
stake in the successful space operations of their customers. Some of the 
manufacturers, such as Space-X, are also operators of space equipment. Space 
equipment manufacturers do significant business with domestic as well as 
foreign governments; they may have competing interests in the success of the 
space activities of different governments. Some of the manufacturers, like 
Boeing, Airbus, Lockheed, and Space-X have significant leverage to assert 
their stakes in outer space, because of their size. Small manufacturers are 
further down the supply line. 48  They assert themselves most effectively 
through their trade associations.49 
The so-called “military-industrial complex” is an example of how 
special interests can assert leverage in outer space. The rapidly growing 
military investments in outer space are good business for the manufacturers 
of space equipment. Therefore, manufacturers have an interest in continuing 
and even increasing their military business. U.S. President Eisenhower, in his 
farewell address to the nation in 1961, warned that the joint interests of the 
military establishment and the manufacturers of military equipment enables 
them to threaten other interests by promoting national investment in military 
equipment.50 The military-industrial complex can apply unique leverage when 
marketing space technology, because most space equipment is dual use, 
serving both civilian and military sectors. The current military space race 
among the United States, Russia, and China encourages the military-industrial 
complexes in the competing states to promote military investments.51 This 
competition may result in promoting use of weaponry in outer space and/or to 
conduct military activities short of war.  
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/opinion/boeing-737-max.html; see also David Gelles, Boeing Says 
Charges Tied to 737 Max Grounding to Reach $8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 18, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/18/business/boeing-737-charge.html. The disaster is estimated to cost 
Boeing $7.8 billion.  
48  See Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961 Farewell Address, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/ 
doc.php?flash=false&doc=90&page=transcript (last visited July 15, 2019). 
49  Id. 
50 Id. 
51  Arms Control, supra note 1, at 157. 
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The major space powers’ investments in military space technology are 
currently increasing. 52  In 2019, the US Department of Defense asked 
Congress for a $14.1 billion increase in military space expenditures.53 Russia 
and China are engaged in corresponding increases in military spending.54 This 
increase in militarization of outer space creates the danger of war in outer 
space. Arms control and disarmament would save government spending and 
lower international tensions.55 
H. Scientists and Astronomers
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty’s primary objective is to make possible
exploration of outer space including the Moon and other celestial bodies.56 
The space age opened outer space for scientific exploration and created 
exciting prospects for astronomical explorations and research. Space scientists 
and explorers are important stakeholders who need ample room and 
opportunity to acquire and use data without interference from the other 
users. 57  Science observation of Earth from outer space is also becoming 
increasingly important to understanding how to maintain the health of the 
planet. 
Scientists and astronomers coordinate extensively though their private 
organizations, such as the International Astronomical Union, the Committee 
for Space Research (“COSPAR”) and the International Astronautical 
Federation. They also coordinate and contribute to the work of the COPUOS 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on space debris, planetary protection, 
and many other outer space issues. Scientific transparency is advantageous for 
users of outer space, contributing to expanded scientific exploration of outer 
space. 
The recent discovery and visualization of black holes at the center of 
galaxies illustrates the importance of continuing exploration and discovery. 
52  Id. 
53  DiMascio & Hudson, supra note 16. 
54  Arms Control, supra note 1, at 156-158.  
55  Id. 
56 Outer Space Treaty art. I, supra note 6, at 207–08. 
57 Id.; see also Jeff Foust, Can Satellite Megaconstellations Be Responsible Users of Space?, 
SPACENEWS (Sep. 2, 2019), https://spacenews.com/can-satellite-megaconstellations-be-responsible-users-
of-space/ (the President of the American Astronomical Society expressed that he was “very worried” about 
lights of small satellites interfering with astronomical observations); Kenneth Chang, NASA Rover on Mars 
Detects Puff of Gas That Hints at Possibility of Life, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/22/science/nasa-mars-rover-life.html. 
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Further exploration and discovery are also needed for the protection of the 
Earth from threats such as asteroid strikes. Sixty million years ago, the Earth 
was struck by an asteroid that extinguished 99.9% of all life on Earth, and it 
will be struck by asteroids again. Most asteroids are currently unidentified, 
and the danger of collision they pose needs to be established.58 Some asteroids 
have been identified and astronomers track their locations.  
Scientists have also pointed to the dangers of climate change. The 
phenomenon and causes of climate change must be closely observed by 
remote sensing from outer space in order to be countered. Observation by 
satellite is a major source of information about the effects of climate change 
on Earth and whether states are adequately complying with limits on global 
warming established by the 2015 Paris Agreement.59 Many people are and 
will be affected by rising seas, increasingly drastic weather patterns, and loss 
of arable land. Monitoring of global warming and weather patterns by remote 
sensing satellites benefit all people on Earth. 
The danger of solar flares is also noted by scientists. Flares may 
suddenly disrupt customary electricity services.60 The 1859 Carrington solar 
flare event proved the likelihood that the Earth will repeatedly experience the 
effects of future solar eruptions.61 Eruptions will disturb communication and 
electrical systems on Earth and in space. The sun must be watched for solar 
eruptions so that warnings can be issued and precautions taken.62 Electronic 
equipment needs to be improved to resist interruptions from solar flares. 
Scientific observations are further necessary in preparation for the 
ultimate transfer of life from Earth to another part of the universe. Scientists 
must prepare for the eventual exit from planet Earth when life on Earth 
becomes impossible due to global warming, asteroid collision, or when the 
Sun eventually burns up. Scientists have recently discovered other planet 
58 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 234–39. See also Regulation, supra note 1, at 104–09, 123–25. 
59 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 359–86. Parties agreed to limit temperature increases to less 
than two degrees in the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Paris Agreement, EUROPA.EU, 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/paris_en (last visited July 26, 2019); Paris 
Agreement, UNITED NATIONS, https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/ 
convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf (last visited July 15, 2019).  
60 Christopher Klein, A Perfect Solar Superstorm: The 1859 Carrington Event, HISTORY (Aug. 22, 
2018), https://www.history.com/news/a-perfect-solar-superstorm-the-1859-carrington-event. 
61  Id. 
62 Id. 
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systems sufficiently close to Earth which can be examined for possible future 
habitation.63 
I. The “Average Person” on the Earth
Few people on Earth pay close attention to outer space activities. The
“Average Person” is busy with the events of daily life. Those “average” 
people’s eyes are on the Earth, not on the skies. However, events in outer 
space can suddenly command attention to these everyday Earthlings. In 2013, 
the people in the Siberian city of Chelyabinsk were astonished when they 
watched an asteroid explode above their city, breaking every window in the 
town.64 Thousands of people were hurt by flying glass and debris. No one was 
killed, although the blast caused significant property damage. Such an asteroid 
strike would have caused much more damage if it had happened over New 
York City or other heavily inhabited locations.65 
Satellite tracking of life on Earth by GNSS is an example of reliance on 
outer space activities. GNSS has revolutionized timing and navigation both 
on Earth and in outer space. There are now four global navigation systems,66 
and it has been declared to be a “national critical function” by the US 
Government.67 The locations of individual persons are tracked from outer 
space by GNSS.68 Privacy concerns of Average Persons is always at stake 
whether or not people know that they are affected. GNSS tracking devices are 
connected to people’s telephones and cars, and other equipment is used to 
track lost people, children, or animals. GNSS tracking raised criminal 
concerns in the case of United States v. Antoine Jones, in which the police 
implanted a GNSS device in Mr. Jones’ car and tracked him for an entire 
63 See generally CHRISTOPHE GALFARD, THE UNIVERSE IN YOUR HAND: A JOURNEY THROUGH SPACE, 
TIME, AND BEYOND 3–50 (2015); Astronomers Are Probing Faraway Planets with Greater Sophistication, 
THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.economist.com/science-and-
technology/2019/08/03/astronomers-are-probing-faraway-planets-with-greater-sophistication.  
64 Chelvabinsk Meteor, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chelyabinsk_meteor (last visited 
May 7, 2019). 
65 Regulation, supra note 1, at 196. The Earth has in the past experienced serious asteroid strikes. An 
asteroid strike 66 million years ago probably extinguished 99.9% of all life on Earth. It is known that asteroid 
strikes will reoccur and that governmental, as well as private, scientists must study the nature and orbits of 
asteroids to observe and prepare for the arrival of so-called Near-Earth Objects (“NEOs”) which are the 
asteroids most dangerous to Earth  
66 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 337. There are now four global GNSS systems: the U.S. Global 
Positioning System (“GPS”), Russian Glonass, European Galileo, and Chinese Beidou. 
67 Dee Ann Divis, Homeland Security Says PNT a “National Critical Function”, INSIDE GNSS, (May 
6, 2019), https;//insidegnss.com/homeland-security-says-pnt-a-national-crtical-function.  
68 Id. 
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month without obtaining a warrant from a court.69 Private persons, other than 
police, also use GNSS to monitor their children, spouses, and employees.70 
Yet another significant use of satellites involves the so-called “unstoppable-
surveillance-industrial complex,” 71  which resulted from the 2015 USA 
Freedom Act.72 Active US government surveillance of individuals continues 
in spite of the constraints of the USA Freedom Act. A recent report by the 
Director of U.S. National Intelligence showed that the organization logged 
19.4 million telephone numbers between May and December 2018.73 
Satellite surveillance has commercial value. For example, the owner of 
a rental car may wish to track its location. Many people have become 
dependent on the existence of global navigation systems to navigate roads and 
streets. However, the GNSS satellite signals are very weak and are easily 
subject to jamming and spoofing.74 
In addition to “average” daily activities, there are global orders that 
affect everyone. People on the Earth are generally dependent on the safety and 
security provided from outer space. Security of people is affected by military 
defense which increasingly includes making decisions about how to employ 
military equipment in outer space. 
Among the current trends, the Average Person’s interests are not well 
represented; there are no organizations promoting such interests. Thought 
needs to be given to how best to represent this affected but unrepresented 
group, as the impacts of outer space grow. Other stakeholders cannot be 
expected to represent them. 
69 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2012). See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 337. 
70 See Paul Larsen, International Regulation of Global Navigation Satellite Systems, 80 J. AIR. L. & 
COM. 388, 388–90 (Regulation of GNSS Tracking Private Issues). 
71 Steven Nelson, NSA Whistleblowers Oppose Freedom Act, Endorse Long-Shot Bill, U.S. NEWS 
(Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/04/27/nsa-whistleblowers-oppose-freedom-
act-endorse-long-shot-bill.  
72 Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline over 
Monitoring Act (USA FREEDOM Act) of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (codified as amended in 
various sections of 18 and 50 U.S. Code). 
73 Charlie Savage, N.S.A. “Unmaskings” of U.S. Identities Soared Last Year, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/30/us/politics/nsa-unmaskings-surveillance-report.html. 
74 See NAVISP Projects Target SATNAV Interference, EUR. SPACE AGENCY (Aug. 5, 2019), 
http://www.esa.int/Applications/Navigation/NAVISP_projects_target_satnav_interference. 
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III. SHARED OUTER SPACE VALUES
The order for outer space activities should reflect the shared values of
the stakeholders and participants in outer space activities. 
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (“OST”) lists and establishes basic 
values agreed to be shared by outer space stakeholders. OST Article VI 
provides that these values (“provisions”) shall apply to both government and 
nongovernmental activities. These shared values are: 
1. Freedom of scientific exploration75
2. Free and unrestricted freedom of access to and use of outer
space on the basis of equality76
3. Sharing of benefits among all the peoples of the world
regardless of their degree of economic and scientific
development77
4. No appropriation of outer space78
5. Peace in outer space and development of friendly relations
among the world’s peoples and countries79
New shared values have developed since 1967, caused by congestion 
and concerns for safety of outer space activities. Such changes in these basic 
values include: 
1. Space debris management to prevent foreclosure of outer
space80
2. Space traffic management to prevent collisions and
interferences with outer space traffic81
75  Outer Space Treaty art. VI, supra note 6, at 209. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. See generally RADIO REGULATIONS, supra note 36, arts. 2 & 5. 
79  See Outer Space Treaty arts. I, III, IV, X, & XII, supra note 6, at 207–09. 
80  Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 4. 
81  Id.; cf. Space Policy Directive-3, supra note 7. 
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Some shared values regarding uses of outer space are in stages of 
development; they are: 
1. Shared guidelines for uses of outer space resources82
2. Shared guidelines for human habitation of outer space83
Many values are not shared among stakeholders. It is apparent that the
stakeholders and the existing different orders of outer space uses overlap and 
sometimes conflict in places. That will be evident from the following 
discussion. 
IV. THE NEW ORDER: COMPETITION FOR DOMINION IN OUTER SPACE
A. No Order in Outer Space
1. Precedent: Exploration and Exploitation of the Americas
Outer space is known as the final frontier. It is still being explored and
exploited and parts of it may become the ultimate habitat of humankind. 
Discovery of new frontiers brings into comparison similar historical examples 
in early Earth explorations. For example, in 1492, Columbus “sailed the ocean 
blue”84 and discovered America. Should we follow the example of the Spanish 
conquistadores in the Americas? At the time of Columbus, the lust for gold 
and silver was the major motivation of Hernan Cortez and his Spanish soldiers 
in conquering the land of the Aztec Indians in Mexico.85 That was also the 
motivation of Francisco Pizarro in his conquest of the Incas.86 The exploits of 
Cortez and Pizarro were authorized by the Kingdom of Spain, which 
benefitted from the American riches. The conquests resulted in the disruption 
and suppression of the native population. This early exploitation in the 
Americas raises the basic issue of whether exploration and exploitation of 
outer space should occur without regulation based on the order of first come 
first served. 
82  See generally Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, supra note 21. 
83  Id. 
84  As the classic nursery rhyme goes. 
85  See Christopher Minster, 10 Notable Spanish Conquistadors Throughout 
History, THOUGHTCO (Jul. 3, 2019), https://www.thoughtco.com/the-conquistadors-2136575. See generally 
W.H. PRESCOTT, THE CONQUEST OF MEXICO (J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 3rd ed. 1965). 
86 See generally W.H. PRESCOTT, THE CONQUEST OF PERU (Dolphin Books, 1962). 
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2. Effect of No Order in Outer Space
Exploration unrestricted by order would only serve a few early arriving
outer space stakeholders, to the exclusion of latecomers. Scientific exploration 
of outer space would suffer from this model. The first-come explorers would 
appropriate valuable resources and leave less for the later explorers. 
Consequently, benefits would not be shared. Explorations by the 
conquistadores did not result in peaceful relations with the American Indians. 
Such freedom of exploitation would be counter to virtually all agreed-upon 
existing values and orders in outer space. 
Unrestricted exploitation of outer space could have been an option 
when outer space access opened with the orbit of Sputnik in 1957. At that 
time, only a few stakeholders were involved. However, outer space is now a 
more sophisticated environment involving many different stakeholders—both 
countries as well as individuals. Thus, the no order option should be discarded; 
although it could become the only option if the excessive space debris 
forecloses access to outer space. 
B. Astronomers’ and Scientists’ Exploration of Outer Space
1. Current Order Governing Astronomers’ and Scientists’ Exploration of
Outer Space
The advancement of astronomy and other sciences in outer space is a
widely shared value. We need to understand the universe. Astronomy and 
science brought us information about the thirteen-billion-year-old “big bang” 
that began the development of the planets and introduced such phenomena as 
dark matter and anti-matter. Gravity is another science phenomenon under 
continued investigation. The galaxies are in continuous movement circling 
around black holes in which yet unknown physical rules apply. 87 
Astronomical observations have identified planets which may be habitable by 
humans and more such planets are being found. The habitability of the Earth 
is endangered by activities such as industrial production of carbon dioxide 
causing global warming, which will eventually make the Earth 
87  See Dennis Overbye, Darkness Visible, Finally: Astronomers Capture First Ever Image of a Black 
Hole, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/science/black-hole-picture.html.  
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uninhabitable.88 Earth is also endangered by sunspots resulting in excessive 
radiation.89  
Other dangers to Earth are the hundreds of thousands of asteroids in the 
asteroid belt, some of which visited the Earth in the past causing near 
extinction of all life forms. Dangerous asteroids, known as near earth objects 
(“NEOs”), are gradually being identified with the hope that they can be 
diverted before colliding with Earth.90 The Earth and the solar system, of 
which it is part, will collapse in the far future. If humans are alive at that time 
they will have left the Earth. Ways to escape from Earth are part of continued 
research not only by astronomers but also by philosophers, medical experts, 
psychologists, and other scientists who would need to make possible the 
transfer of human beings to habitable planets.91 The order that astronomers 
and other scientists recommend must be protected from military and 
commercial encroachments. Consequently, exploration of outer space has 
received legal priority in the OST Article I as follows:  
The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in 
the interests of all countries irrespective of their degree of 
economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of 
mankind. 
Article I of the OST furthermore guarantees “freedom of scientific 
investigation in outer space.”92 Thus, exploration of outer space is protected 
by international law. Outer space research is also protected by national laws. 
In 1958, the United States separated outer space research from military 
research and activities by establishing NASA.93 
Early participants in outer space exploration assumed space to be 
unlimited and thus able to accommodate all uses without limits. Scientific 
outer space explorations like Voyager I and II could be launched without 
88  See MARTIN REES, ON THE FUTURE: PROSPECTS FOR HUMANITY 37–43 (Princeton Univ. Press, 
2018). 
89  Id. 
90   David A. Koplow, Exoatmosheric Plowshares: Using a Nuclear Explosive Device for Planet 
Defense Against an Incoming Asteroid, 23 UCLA J. INT. L. & FOREIGN. AFFAIRS 76, 81–95 (2018). 
91  REES, supra note 88, at 37–43. 
92  Outer Space Treaty art. I, supra note 6, at 207–08. 
93  See National  Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426, 426 (1958) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2451(a) (2006)). 
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concerns about competing users. Commercial users like INTELSAT, 
INMARSAT, SES, the global navigation satellite services (“GNSS”), the 
military outer space operators, as well as LANDSAT and other remote sensing 
operators all launched without much concern about competing users. 
However, they all acknowledge the need for radiofrequencies that are free of 
signal interference. Virtually all the states, as parties to the ITU Constitution 
Art. 44, now acknowledge that outer space radiofrequencies and related 
orbital slots are scarce resources that shall be “used rationally, efficiently and 
economically [so that] all countries may have equitable access to both.”94 
Many states and operators may continue to view outer space as limitless 
and will accommodate all users and uses allowing expansion without 
restraints. However, the new commercial space race and the expanding 
military uses of outer space have changed the human understanding of how 
many activities can be accommodated in the space surrounding the Earth. For 
example, there is about to be a stunning change, from approximately 2000 
operating satellites in outer space to, as widely expected, many thousands of 
operating satellites that will be orbited and deorbited frequently. Furthermore, 
military uses of outer space are increasing.95 Some of these activities will be 
detrimental to scientific investigations. 96  Space is becoming congested. 97 
Need for greater order is evidenced by the United Nations COPUOS space 
debris guidelines, now being enforced as mandatory regulations by some 
states.98 
2. Evaluation of Astronomers’ and Scientists’ Access to Outer Space
Exploration of outer space requires adequate funding by governments.
Astronomers and scientists need unhindered access to outer space for 
observations and experiments. Conflicts exist between science and other uses 
and orders in outer space. An example of commercial interference with 
freedom of scientific exploration is the Space-X launch of 12,000 small 
satellites to provide internet access. This interferes with radiofrequencies used 
by astronomers to map gas in the universe and also with astronomers’ 
visibility of the stars. Plans by Blue Origin to launch thousands of small 
94  ITU Constitution art. 44, supra note 33, at 49. 
95   Deanna Paul, Space: The Final Legal Frontier, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/31/space-final-legal-frontier/. 
96  Id. 
97  LEO Constellations, supra note 1, at 30; see Saadia Pekkanen, The New Space Race, 113 AJIL 
Unbound 92, 109 (2019). 
98  See discussion infra Part IV.F. 
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satellites for competing internet business further threatens scientific activities 
in outer space. 99  Likewise, military activities, such as the recent ASAT 
destruction of a satellite by India, result in added waves of space debris and 
will also interfere with scientific explorations. 100  Moreover, military 
dominance of outer space, to the exclusion of other uses, limits scientific 
exploration. Continued increase of space debris may ultimately foreclose 
access to outer space. Furthermore, any future mining and habitation of 
celestial bodies may need protective regulation of their environments to 
facilitate future scientific explorations. 
Exploration of outer space will continue to be a priority for outer space 
activities. Other stakeholders, including commercial and military operations, 
must allow room for science exploration. That includes both ample support 
for science activities and interference-free space for scientific observations 
and experiments. Congestion of small satellites in LEO may preclude 
astronomy in outer space. If so, then governments must take this issue into 
consideration in authorizing launches. 
C. Viewing Outer Space as a Global Commons
1. Potential Order Based on Global Commons Principle
The concept of a global commons is linked to Art. I of the Outer Space
Treaty statement that outer space is free for use by all states. The original idea 
of common ownership of land is associated with the historic existence of the 
agricultural ‘commons’ in English villages. The agricultural commons idea 
later applied to international global commons resources such as the high seas, 
air, and outer space. If viewed as a global commons, the common uses of all 
outer space would be respected. Military strategists believe the global 
commons concept allows their uses.101 
99  Shannon Hall, After SpaceX Starlink Launch, a Fear of Satellites That Outnumber All Visible Stars, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/01/science/starlink-spacex-astronomers.html. 
See also Foust, Can Megaconstellations Be Responsible Users of Outer Space?, supra note 57.  
100  Jeff Foust, NASA Warns Indian Anti-Satellite Test Increased Debris Risk to ISS, SPACENEWS (Apr. 
8, 2019), https://spacenews.com/nasa-warns-indian-anti-satellite-test-increased-debris-risk-to-iss/. 
101  See Brian Weeden, The Economics of Space Sustainability, THE SPACE REVIEW (Jun. 4, 2012), 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2093/1 (“Outer space is often referred to as being a ‘global 
commons’ in public statements, particularly by the military and closely linked to the perceived global 
commons of the Earth’s atmosphere, oceans, and the Internet.”). See generally Cassandra Steer, Global 
Commons, Cosmic Commons: Implications of Military and Security Uses of Outer Space, 18 GEORGETOWN 
J. INT’L AFFAIRS 9 (2017).
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Some economists have contrasted the idea of the commons with the 
idea of private ownership, arguing that private ownership is the more 
productive use of property and thus a logical and desirable replacement for 
common ownership.102 This free market economy line of thinking might lead 
the reader to conclude that individual commercial exploitation of 
unappropriated outer space is a preferable model for order in outer space. 
However, past experience with private enterprise exploitation of fisheries in 
the ocean global commons led to overfishing and mismanagement of ocean 
resources. As such, economist Elinor Ostrom suggests eight requirements for 
successful management of common property:103 
1. Clearly defined boundaries.
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules
and local conditions.
3. Collective-choice arrangements allowing for the
participation of most of the appropriators in the decision-
making process.
4. Effective monitoring by monitors who are part of or
accountable in the appropriations.
5. Graduated sanctions for appropriators who do not respect
community rules.
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms which are cheap and easy
to access
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize (e.g., by
government authorities)
102  See generally  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
103  Jay Walljasper, Elinor Ostrom’s 8 Principles for Managing a Commons, COMMONS MAG.: ON THE 
COMMONS (Oct. 2, 2011), http://www.onthecommons.org/magazine/elinor-ostroms-8-principles-managing-
commmons#sthash.btEJhHrA.dpbs; see also Simon Fairlie, A Short History of Enclosure in Britain, THE 
LAND, http://www.thelandmagazine.org.uk/articles/short-history-enclosure-britain (visited July 16, 2019); 
The Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group, INT’L INST. OF AIR AND SPACE LAW, 
https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/law/institute-of-public-law/institute-of-air-space-law/the-hague-space-
resources-governance-working-group. 
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8. In case of large common property management protocols:
Organization in the form of multiple layers of protocols.
Two international management arrangements would satisfy the 
management criteria proposed by Professor Ostrom.104 First, the ITU Radio 
Regulations Board is the universally accepted international management of a 
global resource, the radiofrequencies. As described below, the ITU Board 
supervises international allocation and registration of radio frequencies. The 
international management of this global resource is particularly relevant 
because it is founded on the assumption that the receiving satellite operators 
do not become owners of the allocated radiofrequencies and related orbits. 
They merely obtain use. Thus, ownership of global commons resources, such 
as lunar mining, is not an issue. Second, another international common 
resource management arrangement is that of deep-sea mining of the oceans 
arranged by the 1994 Protocol to the Law of the Seas (“LOS”) Convention. 
The high seas, like outer space, are not subject to national appropriation by 
claims of sovereignty. Briefly, the 1994 LOS Protocol establishes: (1) a 
management council that would include the United States, with voting rights 
commensurate with its economic interests; (2) a managing council which will 
not unduly limit productivity; (3) no direct transfer of technology 
requirement; (4) access to commercial opportunities on a first come first 
served basis; (5) a reasonable management fee, and (6) market oriented 
management policies.105 The United States accepted the 1994 Protocol but has 
not yet ratified it because the market demand for deep sea mining has not 
developed as hoped.106 Adoption of either of these two international resource 
management arrangements for outer space have the benefit of avoiding 
ruinous disputes over desirable market opportunities. Unilateral regulation of 
commercial activities in outer space is not effective because outer space is not 
sovereign. International agreement or consensus can establish an orderly 
marketplace. Managed uses of the global commons could also ease spoliation 
of outer space resources.  
Outer space is fragile. Unlike Earth, outer space is not able to heal itself 
from abuses such as deposits of space debris of space objects launched from 
104  See discussion infra Part IV.E. 
105  See generally Bernard H. Oxman, The 1994 Agreement and the Convention, 88 
AM. J. INT’L L. 687 (1994); Maureen Williams, The Moon Agreement in the Current Scenarios, 53 PROC. 
INT’L INST. SPACE L. 117 (2010). 
106  Lunar mining has also not developed as hoped. See generally Williams, supra note 105. 
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Earth. Overall management is needed.107 The vastness of outer space is no 
longer sufficient reason to allow unlimited uses. Mismanagement of outer 
space resources is a current and increasing problem to the extent that it 
threatens to foreclose access to outer space.108 The Kessler syndrome foretells 
that the dangerous increases in space debris will impede and eventually stop 
access to outer space.109 Intentional destruction of satellites by China, the 
United States, and, most recently, India have exacerbated the space debris 
problem. 110  Another problem is the scarcity of suitable slots in the 
geostationary orbit that is already populated by many military and 
communications satellites, in mid-Earth orbit as well as global navigation 
satellite systems. Certain low-earth orbits are already populated by remote 
sensing and communications satellites.111 
a. Evaluation of the Global Commons Principle
The global commons order of non-sovereign outer space is based on the
idea that outer space cannot be appropriated by any one state or commercial 
enterprise. It is free for use by military as well as civilian users.112 Outer space 
is inherently common and should be accepted as such. A global commons 
regime for outer space would be subject not only to the management of its 
users, but also to existing laws and regulations. A managed global commons 
would support continued scientific exploration, while providing unrestricted 
freedom of access to the users. It would share outer space benefits among the 
users. It could resolve current conflicts among states about the right to own 
and exploit the resources including mining of celestial bodies. However, it 
could conflict with demands of military authorities who view outer space as 
an exclusive military domain. Similar to the discussion about the English 
commons, a big issue raised is whether common management of outer space 
resources can match or do better than unilateral private enterprise. In the past, 
under commercial management, there has been excessive exploitation of non-
107  Space Policy Directive–3, supra note 7; Managing, supra note 1, at 99. 
108  See generally Kessler Syndrome, supra note 3. 
109  Id. 
110  Solving, supra note 1, at 475. 
111  LEO Constellations, supra note 1, at 30. 
112  The Moon Agreement states a basic global commons principle that “the Moon and its natural 
resources are the common heritage of mankind.” Moon Agreement, supra note 6, at 25. That represents a 
conflict between the nineteen states parties to the Moon Agreement and those states, like the United States 
and Luxembourg, which favor the commercial order of first-come-first-served. See discussion infra Part 
IV.G; see also 2 COLOGNE COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 325.
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sovereign resources such as over-fishing of the oceans, and exhaustive mining 
of resources.  
Ultimately, there needs to be international agreement on space resource 
management in order that mining of the Moon and all other celestial bodies 
can proceed. Two management options are suggested: (1) Creation of an 
intentional management council modeled on the ITU Radio Regulations 
Board that avoids the issue of direct ownership, or (2) management drawing 
on experience with the 1994 Law of the Seas Protocol.113 
Existing users recognize the need for overall management of space 
debris and space traffic.114 The huge increase in the number of satellites in 
outer space expected in the next ten years has made management of all the 
moving satellites in outer space a major concern.115 Some aspects of outer 
space are already subject to international management. For example, the 
commercial uses of radiofrequencies and related orbits are subject to 
international control through the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) which organizes the use of radiofrequencies and related orbits for all 
satellites.116 
D. Outer Space Order Established by Current International and National
Law
1. Existing International Legal Order117
Outer Space is not “lawless” and open to unbridled exploitation by
conquistadors like the Americas were in the 1500s. In 1967 the United Nations 
adopted as fundamental doctrine that outer space must be governed by 
international law.118 Importantly, a foundational framework governing outer 
space was established by the Outer Space Treaty.119 The OST is in the nature 
113  See supra text accompany notes 105 and 106. 
114  See generally Hague Space Res. Governing Working Grp., Draft Building Blocks for the Dev. of 
an Int’l. Framework on Space Res. Activities (2017). See also Managing, supra note 1, at 99. 
115  Small Satellite, supra note 1, at 276–80. The new space race questions the legal principles 
established by the OST, in particular its Article II prohibition of national appropriation of outer space. See 
Saadia Pekkanen, The New Space Race, supra note 97, at 93–97. 
116  See discussion on ITU infra Part IV.E. 
117  See, e.g., relevant space law treaties cited supra note 6. 
118  Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/18/1962 (Dec. 13, 1963). 
119  See relevant space law treaties cited supra note 6. These are supplemented by the UN Charter and 
other international laws, including customary international law. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 27–
48.
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of a constitution for outer space rather than a minutely-detailed law 
establishing order in outer space. Importantly, the OST preamble explains that 
its objective is to further space exploration and use for the benefit of all the 
peoples of the world.120 Article I states that the Treaty’s priority is discovery 
and exploration and that uses of outer space must be based on equality of states 
and be used for the benefit of humankind. Free access to outer space is 
guaranteed. Additionally, Article II provides that outer space is not subject to 
national appropriation by states.121 The OST is a framework, the details of 
which will be filled in by further international and national law, including 
standards and guidelines. An example of such further implementation would 
be the establishment of an order in outer space that resolves the current traffic 
congestion caused by the huge increase in moving objects.  
The focus of the OST was on governmental rather than on non-
governmental outer space activities. Arguments have been made that non-
governmental operators are outside the Treaty because they are not 
specifically mentioned in Art II. However, that argument is not accepted by 
states. OST, Art. VI clearly provides that OST binds non-governments as well 
as governmental entities. The States are obligated to apply all the provisions 
of the Treaty to all its national non-governmental commercial operators. 
Accordingly, governments are required by the treaty to authorize and 
continuously supervise all nongovernmental activities in outer space. 
Furthermore, Art. III of the OST makes international law, in particular 
the UN Charter, applicable in outer space. OST Art. IV restricts military uses 
of outer space. Art IV prohibits placing nuclear weapons and other weapons 
of mass destruction in orbit around the Earth and it demilitarizes all celestial 
bodies. Thus, at the time of its adoption, the OST was considered the most 
important disarmament treaty since WWII.122  
OST Art. VII makes states internationally liable for all damages caused 
by any space objects which they launch or procure to be launched. Under Art. 
VIII, states retain jurisdiction over objects that they launch into outer space 
and Art. IX provides that States must pay due regard to each other regarding 
120  Outer Space Treaty preamble, supra note 6, at 207. 
121  Id. at 208. 
122  Statement by the President Announcing the Reaching of an Agreement on an Outer Space Treaty, 2 
PUB. PAPERS 1441 (Dec. 8, 1966) (US President Lyndon Johnson referred to the Outer Space Treaty as the 
most important disarmament treaty of the cold war); see also James Reston, Let ‘Em Eat Missiles, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 9, 1966, at 46; Koplow, supra note 90, at 105. 
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their activities while in outer space. The Liability Convention further regulates 
the liability of outer space activities.123 The Registration Convention requires 
all space objects to be nationally and internationally registered for 
identification purposes.124  
This is a thumbnail sketch describing the basic applicable international 
law order to which all outer space activities are subject. In implementing the 
OST, States have further agreed to be subject to generally applicable 
international regulations limiting the amount of space debris that their outer 
space activities may cause.125 Also, outer space activities will likely be subject 
to STM and other generally applicable rules of behavior in order to make 
possible the large mixture of space activities expected to exist in the future.126 
The outer space treaties have been generally adopted by all the space 
faring states as well as by all other interested states, thus raising an expectation 
that they are so generally accepted that they have become customary 
international law. In fact, some of these treaty principles have already been 
declared customary international law. As such they become universally 
applicable.127 
2. National Legal Order
In 2013 COPUOS prepared, and the UN General assembly adopted, its
Recommendations on National Legislation Relevant to the Peaceful 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, UNGA Res. 68/74. Consequently, many 
countries adopted national laws implementing the space law treaties in 
varying forms.128 A number of countries, for example India, simply make the 
international space law treaties apply directly without adoption of 
implementing national laws. Whereas, other states directly apply their 
national laws to govern the outer space activities of both governmental and 
non-governmental space objects.  
The United States implemented most of the OST by national law, 
establishing basic governmental regulation and supervision by the Federal 
123  See Liability Convention, supra note 6.  
124  See generally Registration Convention, supra note 6. 
125  See generally Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 4. 
126  See generally STM, supra note 7; Space Traffic, supra note 1. 
127  LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 63. 
128  Setsuko Aoki, Domestic Legal Conditions for Space Activities in Asia, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 103, 
103 (2019). 
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Aviation Administration (“FAA”) of all non-governmental launches of space 
objects. Although the U.S. Constitution Article VI makes international treaties 
“the Supreme Law of the Land,”129 U.S. space launch laws presently only 
require governmental authorization for launches and reentry of satellites.130 
Importantly, the governmental licensing process makes it possible for the 
government to influence the establishment of order among all space’s 
competing interests.  The United States is expected to adopt regulations 
governing the activities of non-governmental operators in outer space as well. 
Furthermore, U.S. satellite operators are subject to FCC regulations of 
radiofrequencies and related orbits used by non-governmental operators while 
in outer space. The FCC issues radiofrequency licenses to satellite operators 
in accordance with its determination whether granting a license is in the public 
interest.131 Thus, the FCC can influence order among the competing interests 
in outer space. 
It can happen that Individual states adopt laws governing activities of 
their non-governmental operators that interpret and potentially conflict with 
the Outer Space Treaty’s rights of free use of outer space. For example, 
Luxembourg went further by adopting legislation approving appropriation of 
outer space resources by individual states and operators. The United States 
has tried to limit such potential conflicts by prescribing that national space 
laws shall be applied so as to conform with international laws, but some other 
nations have questioned its compliance.132 
National regulation authorizing outer space activities raises the 
question of whether individual states authorizing non-governmental operators 
to launch satellites also possess the resources to supervise its authorized 
operators, thus enforcing its regulations in outer space. 133 The large space 
powers such as the United States, Russia, and China, have ample enforcement 
resources, but many small states do not have sufficient enforcement resources. 
Nevertheless, under the Outer Space Treaty, all member states have equal 
129  U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
130  See Commercial Space Launch Activities, 51 U.S.C. § 509 (2015) (the United States has not yet 
made the U.S. Space Launch Act applicable in outer space. It only applies to launches and deorbits). 
131  47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 307 (1982) (under the U.S. Communications Act, the FCC decides whether 
granting an application is in the public interest). The FCC enforces the ITU Radio Regulations. See Christian 
Zur, Small Satellites are Big Business, SPACENEWS, Aug. 7, 2019, at 28 (in 2018 the FCC issued 13,237 
satellite operating licenses in accordance with its regulation). The FCC is presently debating whether to 
change its regulations, further liberalizing licensing of small satellites. . 
132 See generally Schilling, supra note 27. 
133 Id. LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 416–17; see also Small Satellite, supra note 1, at 289–91. 
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authority under Art. VI to authorize access to and use of outer space by non-
governmental operators. That raises the possibility of rogue non-
governmental operators from other states obtaining operating authorization 
from so-called “flag-of-convenience” states that do not have adequate 
regulation and enforcement capabilities. 134  For example, a flag-of-
convenience state may authorize launch of dangerously fragile foreign 
satellites likely to fail or disintegrate into debris in outer space. The rapidly 
increasing volume of space debris increases danger of collisions with satellites 
in outer space.135 
3. Evaluation
a. International Space Law
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty established the basic order for outer space
activities. However, it needs to be updated to meet current and future 
requirements. Such activities include many current outer space uses, such as 
mining on celestial bodies, space debris accumulation, space traffic 
management, and liability for collisions and other interference. Uniform 
international standards and recommended practices must be allowed to 
develop for these activities. 
International space law was adopted in the early part of the outer space 
age when the adopting states did not foresee the future development of non-
governmental satellite operations in outer space. 136  Space technology has 
developed rapidly since then. Failure of the Moon Agreement to attract major 
space powers shows the difficulty of coming to international agreement in the 
current space age. There is urgent need for international agreement on doing 
business in outer space and diminishing the military space race. The 
prospective plans for humans to live in outer space require international 
agreement. It is as if the world is waiting for some major disaster in outer 
space to happen before the states can accept the need for further international 
agreement about their co-existence in outer space. 
134  See Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, supra note 21 (urging 
such states to develop adequate capabilities from the expertise of international organizations and states with 
developed oversight capabilities). 
135  Solving supra note 1, at 477. 
136  LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 417. 
DECEMBER 2019 OUTER SPACE 31 
b. National Space Law
International space law requires compliance by the states. National
legal enforcement and implementation of international law is an important 
way for the governments to influence order among the competing outer space 
interests. However, divergent national interpretations of the existing 
international legal framework are beginning to develop. The reason is that new 
space technology and outer space uses have developed subsequent to adoption 
of the existing legal principles. There will be increasing confusion as these 
interpretations bump up against one another.137  
The individual states will have important functions to enforce and 
implement international standards and recommended practices. That will 
include significant opportunities to establish order among the competing 
interests in outer space. 
E. Regulation of Outer Space by the International Telecommunication
Union138
1. ITU Order
For numerous reasons, radio frequencies are limited outer space
resources. Besides a state’s need for exclusive frequencies, only higher range 
radio frequencies can be used for satellite communication and navigation. 
Another reason is the huge and increasing demand for frequencies. 
Furthermore, military use of frequencies is not subject to ITU regulation. The 
ITU will only recognize and register cleared radiofrequencies in its Master 
International Frequency Register. 139  The Master International Frequency 
Register is the only registry of international frequencies in the world and the 
competition for registration is intense. Satellite operators must check the ITU 
registry for radiofrequencies that are free of harmful interference before 
137  See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 413–46. Another example is mining of celestial bodies. 
Some states have adopted legislation granting commercial operators legal right to mined resources resulting 
from celestial mining, thus raising the question of whether celestial mining is permitted in light of the OST 
Article II prohibition on appropriation of non-sovereign celestial bodies. See also Bruno, Is Space Due for 
Some Bootstrapping?, supra note 28 (the major asteroid mining companies no longer exist due to economic 
decline of asteroid mining). 
138  LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 195–220. 
139  P. J. Blount, Space Traffic Management: Standardizing On-Orbit Behavior, 133 AJIL UNBOUND, 
122, 125 (2019). 
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applying for use of a specific frequency. Thus, the ITU Register is extremely 
useful in planning future outer space activities. But 
Radio frequencies and related orbits are subject to final regulation and 
allocation by the individual ITU member states. Potential conflict exists that 
radiofrequencies used by 5G wireless signals may significantly interfere with 
weather satellites’ data collection. 140  The US Federal Communication 
Commission has begun to auction off frequencies for 5G service that could 
result in interference with weather satellites. The FCC plans to deregulate and 
expedite frequency applications by small satellites. 141  The ITU becomes 
concerned when one state’s frequency assignments affect, overlap, or in other 
ways cause harmful interference with assignment of radio frequencies by 
another state. The competing countries and operators may negotiate among 
themselves for use of specific frequencies in order to file for cleared 
frequencies in the ITU Register. One solution for competing requests for 
frequencies may be for one applicant to agree to become a secondary user 
accessing a frequency only to the extent that it does not interfere with the 
frequency use of the primary user.142 
The ITU Radio Regulations Board administers the rules of procedure 
for frequency registrations.143 The Board maintains oversight of the ITU staff, 
which administers registrations into the International Frequency Register. The 
Board consists of no more than twelve members who are nationals of ITU 
members, but they must all be of different nationalities. Individual members 
may not participate in any matters affecting their own states.144 The Board is 
elected by the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference from among the ITU members. 
These members are required to have the expertise necessary to conduct their 
technical duties and administer the rules governing registrations. Ultimately, 
140  See Robin McKie, 5G Signal Could Jam Satellites that Help with Weather Forecasting, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 4, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/04/5g-mobile-networks-threat-to-
world-weather-forecasting. 
141  Michael Bruno, Smallsats Go Big, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 29–Aug. 18, 2019, at 57 
(explaining that the FCC imposed a heavy fine on Swarm Technologies for launching untrackable small 
satellites without FCC authorization); see also Yousaf Butt, Avoiding Collisions in Outer Space, N.Y TIMES 
(Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/opinion/space-race-regulation.html. 
142  See generally ITU, Final Acts WRC-97 of the World Radiocommunication Conference (Geneva, 
1997). 
143  Radio Regulations Board, ITU, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/conferences/RRB/Pages/ 
default.aspx (last visited Dec. 17, 2019). 
144  Id. 
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the Board maintains oversight of registrations to avoid harmful interferences 
with already registered frequencies. 
While the ITU authorizes registration of radio frequencies free of 
harmful interference on a first-come first-served basis,145 there are restrictions 
and qualifications. The 1979 ITU Administrative Radio Conference 146 
clarified that the states, and in turn their authorized operators, do not own 
allocated radio frequencies and related orbital slots.147 Allocated ownership 
would be contrary to OST Article II, which prohibits permanent appropriation 
of outer space. Furthermore, the 1985–1988 ITU World Administrative Radio 
Conferences pre-allocated one orbital slot on the GSO to each state for direct 
broadcast purposes. However, the Conferences did not recognize the claims 
of the Bogota Declaration countries to sovereign rights in the GSO.148 It is 
also important to note the constitutional mandate in Article 44 that allocations 
shall be distributed “rationally, efficiently and economically”149 and that the 
special needs of the developing countries must be taken into consideration in 
the distribution of radiofrequencies and related orbital slots. 
2. Evaluation
Decision-making in the ITU is independent of and differs from that of
COPUOS. The ITU regulates only radiofrequencies and related orbits. It is 
governed by its separate legal regime reflecting its values, only. Thus, the ITU 
does not necessarily share the same outer space values that are linked to the 
OST listed in Part Two above. ITU’s decision-making may differ or even 
conflict with that of COPUOS. Secondly, the ITU regime affects only non-
military frequencies, although military authorities tend to pay attention to 
ITU’s register of frequencies for reasons of safety. Thirdly, non-governmental 
communication satellite operators have considerable influence through their 
participation in the ITU sectors. Thus, the distribution of frequencies may be 
influenced by nongovernmental operators.  
The ITU serves the unique function of making satellite navigation 
possible through its oversight of radiofrequencies used for the navigation of 
satellites. Satellite operators can operate in outer space thanks to the ITU 
145  RADIO REGULATIONS, supra note 36, art. 5; see LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 189–226 
(discussion of ITU).  
146  See ITU, Final Acts WRC-97 of the World Radiocommunication Conference (Geneva, 1997). 
147  Id. 
148  Id. 
149  ITU Constitution art. 44, supra note 33, at 49. 
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provision of radiofrequencies free of radio interference. Radio interference is 
a violation of the ITU legal regime, but the ITU does not have a police force 
to enforce its regulations. Regulation enforcement is mainly the responsibility 
of individual states that are under great pressure to provide licenses for the 
large number of small satellites now being launched. The temptation to launch 
without an FCC license is great, but enforcement must prevail to prevent 
dangerous chaos.150 
F. Military Order of Outer Space
1. Military Regime
Military users form yet another order in outer space. Its special rules
can conflict with other uses and orders. U.S., Chinese, and Russian military 
authorities consider outer space to be an operational “military domain.”151 
This is further evidence of the fragmented uses and regulations of outer space, 
resulting in potentially conflicting uses. Outer space provides military 
strategists with the proverbial high grounds from which to dominate the 
Earth’s surface.152 Unilateral domination of outer space to the exclusion of 
other users is particularly valued. Weaponry may be stationed in outer space 
to destroy weaponry of others in outer space or to strike the Earth. Ballistic 
missiles may be launched from Earth’s surface to strike targets in outer space 
or on distant places on the Earth. Additionally, outer space is very important 
for gathering intelligence by remote sensing satellites about other states’ 
deployment of weaponry and plans for military actions. Most outer space 
equipment can be used for both military and civilian activities.  
Military activity in outer space is increasing drastically because the 
United States, Russia and China are competing with each other without 
150  See Marina Koren, Launching Rogue Satellites Into Space Was a “Mistake,” THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 
7, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/09/spacebees-swarm-unauthorized-satellite-
launch/569395/; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 189–226 (ITU depends on individual governments to 
enforce its registration regime); see also Butt, supra note 141. 
151  U.S. Space Policy Directive-4, issued February 19, 2019, requires “unfettered use of space for 
United States national security purposes.” The directive asserts U.S. “freedom of operation in, from, and to 
the space domain” consistent with applicable law, including international law. Presidential Memorandum on 
Space Policy Directive-4, Establishment of the United States Space Force (Feb. 19, 2019), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/text-space-policy-directive-4-establishment-united-states-
space-force/ [hereinafter Space Policy Directive-4]. See also Matthew T. King & Laurie R. Blank, 
International Law and Security in Outer Space: Now and Tomorrow, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 125, 126 (2019). 
152  LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 447.  
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constraints. 153  Military authorities consider access to outer space to be 
increasingly competitive as well as dangerously congested.154 Lately India, 
France, and Japan have joined the competition.155 Consequently, the military 
uses of outer space easily overlap and compete with uses of outer space by 
other orders. New military competitors are reacting to the domination of the 
outer space high ground by the three major space powers. Countries other than 
the United States, Russia, and China feel insecure and consequently have 
begun to acquire military outer space capabilities.156 India’s anti- satellite test 
is evidence of the growing military counterspace movement.157 The growth of 
military technology also results in competition and possible friction with 
commercial satellite operators who are also expanding their outer space 
activities.158 
Military use is subject to a special set of treaties, agreements and rules 
such as the Rules of War and the Limited Test Ban Treaty.159 In particular, it 
is subject to the peacekeeping rules of the UN Charter and, in turn, subject to 
the peacekeeping oversight of the UN Security Council. In this context, it is 
important that the Article 103 of the UN Charter provides that the UN Charter 
will prevail over other treaties in the event of a conflict. Thus, in the event of 
a conflict between the UN Charter and the Outer Space Treaty or the 1963 
Test Ban Treaty, the decisions of the UN Security Council will apply and be 
enforced.160 
Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, individual states retain the right of 
self-defense in outer space.161 Thus, states may deter unfriendly activities of 
153  Larsen, Arms Control, supra note 1, at 157. 
154  LEO Constellations, supra note 1, at 30. 
155  See Debra Werner, Boycott Indian Launchers? Industry Reacts to India’s Anti-satellite Weapon 
Test, SPACENEWS (Mar. 27, 2019), https://spacenews.com/reactions-to-indian-asat/; Norimitsu Onishi, 
France Nudges Europe Into Space Race, Where it Lags Behind, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/18/world/europe/france-europe-space-race-apollo-11-anniversary.html? 
searchResultPosition=12 (France President Emmanuel Macron stated that the French initiative “would ensure 
our defense of space within space”); Saadia M. Pekkanen, All Eyes on China, But Japan May Be The Space 
Power to Watch, FORBES (May 30, 2015, 9:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/saadiampekkanen/2015/05/30/all-eyes-on-china-but-japan-may-be-the-space-power-to-
watch/#68f445b14a8f. 
156  Larsen, Arms Control, supra note 1, 157. 
157  Werner, supra note 155; Onishi, supra note 155; Pekkanen, All Eyes on China, supra note 155. 
158  See FIFTH PSSI SPACE SECURITY CONFERENCE, http://spacesecurity.eu/ (last visited July 10, 2019). 
159  Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 
5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1963). 
160  U.N. Charter art. 103; see also King & Blank, supra note 151, at 126; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 
14, at 447–81. 
161  U.N. Charter art. 51. 
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other states consistent with Article 51. However, the legal right of self-defense 
is not unlimited. The right of self-defense exists only until the UN Security 
Council takes measures to maintain international peace and security. Threats 
to use force in outer space are subject to Security Council jurisdiction under 
the UN Charter Chapter VII.162 As a practical matter, the Security Council will 
need time to evaluate disputed situations before making decisions. In the 
meantime, Article 51’s authority controls, meaning that individual states 
retain the right to engage in military outer space activities. 
Arms control is a fundamental part of the Outer Space Treaty; former 
United States President Lyndon B. Johnson characterized the Outer Space 
Treaty as the “most important arms control development” of the Cold War.163 
OST Article I requires outer space to be used for the benefit of all people. This 
article adds to the specific restrictions in Articles II, III, IV, VI, and IX. Article 
II prohibits military appropriation of celestial bodies. Article III makes outer 
space, including celestial bodies, subject to both the UN Charter and 
international treaties on maintaining international peace and security. Article 
VI permits “use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other 
peaceful purposes” on celestial bodies. 164  Significantly, the United States 
interprets the OST to apply to non-aggressive uses of outer space rather than 
to non-military uses, thus allowing military uses that are not aggressive.165 
Article IV prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit and 
demilitarizes all celestial bodies. Article VI requires states to not only comply 
with the OST, but also to ensure that their non-governmental bodies comply 
with the OST. Furthermore, Article IX requires states to pay “due regard” to 
the corresponding interests of other states in outer space166  
The Liability Convention Article II holds states liable for the loss of life 
and property damages on the Earth’s surface and air that are caused to other 
states and their nongovernmental entities. Article III makes states similarly 
liable for outer space damages, but this assessment is based on a finding of 
162  U.N. Charter ch. VII (dealing with actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace 
and acts of aggression and stating that the Security Council must determine existence of threats to the peace 
and acts of aggression). 
163  Statement by the President Announcing the Reaching of an Agreement on an Outer Space Treaty, 
supra note 122. 
164  Outer Space Treaty art. VI, supra note 6, at 209. 
165  King & Blank, supra note 151, at 126.  
166  The Precautionary Principle is relevant to the interpretation of OST Article IX. See generally Paul 
B. Larsen, Application of the Precautionary Principle to the Moon, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 295, 295–306 (2006);
LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 245–80.
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fault. Thus, Chinese and Indian ASATS in outer space would be subject to 
liability for damages. Furthermore, the Registration Convention requires UN 
registration of all space objects, including military space objects.167 
Military uses are subject to several special international treaty 
obligations. The United States and other countries operate under the Law of 
Armed Conflict in outer space activities in accordance with DOD Directive 
2311.O1E. The DOD Manual provides that the Law of Armed Conflict 
regulates “the conduct of hostilities in outer space.”168 Other states may or 
may not agree with the United States. The United States applies the Law of 
Armed Conflict to confrontations short of war; however, such application is 
subject to the legal requirement of proportionality of responses.169 The OST 
Article IV prohibition on deployment of weapons of mass destruction in 
Earth’s orbit, including celestial bodies, and demilitarization of celestial 
bodies allows the individual state some flexibility to do as it wishes. The 
United States takes advantage of this flexibility, although it involves risk of 
conflict.170 
Outer space military technology is primarily concentrated in four space 
powers: United States, Russia, China and now India. 171  That leaves the 
remaining countries in the position of being subject to the predominance of 
these four countries. Historically, the United States has predominated in outer 
space, but is now being challenged by the other powers. These countries 
compete fiercely for military dominance over the non-sovereign outer space. 
The competing countries have, or are in the process of establishing, 
specialized military space forces similar to the United States’ Army, Navy, 
and Air Force. The reason for this development is that outer space is no longer 
peaceful but “has become a battle ground where the ability to destroy satellites 
is a key capability in warfare.”172 One United States decisionmaker states that 
governments must now be able to recognize the necessity of a special military 
167  Registration Convention, supra note 6; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 463. However, 
inadequate national compliance remains a problem, see infra text accompanying note 216. 
168  U.S. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEP’T. OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL ¶ 14.10.4 (2016), 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-
%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190. 
169  King & Blank, supra note 151, at 127. 
170  Id.  
171  See Jeff Faust, NASA Warns Indian Anti-Satellite Test Increased Debris Risk to ISS, supra note 100. 
172  See Dominic Gates, Defense Official Talks Space Force and How Military Will Leverage Tech 
Giants, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/deputy-defense-
secretary-talks-space-force-and-how-military-will-leverage-local-tech-giants/. See also Space Policy 
Directive-4, supra note 151. 
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space force to defend the nation and to protect space commerce and civil space 
exploration.173 
Each space power increases its military presence commensurate with 
increases of its competitors. This competition results in continued escalation. 
ASAT exercises in outer space by these states have resulted in substantial 
increases in space debris. Further military activities will have additional 
detrimental effect to the extent that it could trigger the Kessler Syndrome, 174 
which forecasts an ultimate foreclosure of access to outer space due to space 
debris. Foreclosure of access into outer space would also cause future 
foreclosure for military weaponry. The alternative would be to enter into 
agreement on outer space arms control but leave room for remote sensing. 
Such agreement could best be negotiated directly among the four space 
powers. However, military uses of outer space are a core aspect of the general 
arms race; it is so integrated into other military systems that they are difficult 
to select out for special arms control.175 
2. Evaluation
Military uses tend to exclude other uses and easily conflict with non-
military uses of outer space. Military uses consider outer space to be “military 
domain,” subject to the Law of Armed Conflict, rather than space law 
governing non-military activities. Different rules apply in outer space for the 
military.176 Thus, peace in outer space and development of friendly relations 
among the world’s peoples and countries are not the prevailing military value. 
The Outer Space Treaty can be preempted. Article 103 of the UN Charter 
makes the Charter preeminent of other treaties and therefore enables the UN 
Security Council to prevail over the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. UN 
Charter Article 51 allows the individual countries the right of military self-
defense if attacked. The OST itself is subject to special interpretation for 
military uses, because countries, like the United States and other militarily 
powerful countries, interpret the OST Article IV provision on peaceful uses to 
173  See Jeff Foust, Cruz Criticizes House for Lack of Action on Commercial Space Legislation, 
SPACENEWS (Oct. 31, 2019), https://spacenews.com/cruz-criticizes-house-for-lack-of-action-on-
commercial-space-legislation/. 
174  See Kessler Syndrome, WIKIPEDIA, supra note 3. 
175  LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 449. 
176  See generally King & Blank, supra note 151.  
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mean non-aggressive rather than non-military uses. That interpretation would 
limit the scope of the OST.177 
Military activities, such as the destruction of a Chinese satellite by a 
Chinese ASAT and the recent destruction of an Indian satellite by an Indian 
anti-satellite missile, have greatly increased space debris of the sort that can 
lead to the ultimate foreclosure of outer space as predicted by the Kessler 
Syndrome. 178  Such added space debris also presents increased collision 
danger for all non-military space traffic. 
A final source of conflict between military and other uses and orders in 
outer space is that military and civilian uses are discussed and decided in 
different UN fora. Military uses are discussed and decided in the UN 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Civilian matters are discussed in 
COPUOS located in Vienna, Austria. These separable fora may lead to further 
difference in sharing of outer space values.179 
The claimed military domain is now expanding at the expense of non-
military activities. Until recently, military presence in outer space was mostly 
concentrated in the geostationary orbit. Military presence is moving into the 
low Earth orbit, which is already congested with commercial and scientific 
activities, such as the International Space Station. United States announced 
that outer space is the next war-fighting domain and US military experts now 
regard outer space as a “degraded and operationally-limited environment” 
where it contests with other users.180 The expansion of military order at the 
expense of other uses is potentially a serious problem, because (1) it tends to 
be exclusive, and (2) exclusive claims are not legitimate in non-sovereign 
outer space. There are, however, modifying factors. In times of peace, the 
military makes extensive use of non-military uses, such as civilian 
communication and reconnaissance satellites. Secondly, the military tends to 
observe civilian operating procedures for reasons of safety. 
177  Katie Rogers & Helene Cooper, Trump Authorizes a Space Command. Next, He Wants a Space 
Force, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/29/us/politics/trump-space-
command-force.html?auth=login-email&login=email (quoting L. R. Blank, military space law expert at 
Emory University, stating “we are ready to do what we need to do and counter what our adversaries are 
doing”); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 468–69. 
178  See Kessler Syndrome, WIKIPEDIA, supra note 3. 
179  UN Disarmament Conference, supra note 12. Arms Control, supra note 2, at 155–56. 
180  AFSPC Public Affairs, AFSPC Commander Announces Space Enterprise Vision, AIR FORCE SPACE 
COMMAND (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.afspc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/730817/afspc-
commander-announces-space-enterprise-vision/; see also Arms Control, supra note 143–45. 
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G. The Commercial Order in Outer Space
1. Light Touch Commercial Space Order
The light touch commercial approach is presently advocated for by the
United States National Space Council, and is implemented by government 
agencies as mandated by the 2018 United States Space Policy Directives 2 
and 3.181 This commercial approach stresses the importance of accepting the 
lead of the commercial operators in outer space order, because “the rules and 
values of space, like every frontier, will be written by those who get there 
first.”182 The thinking is that free enterprise and its profit-making objective 
should be the basic values reflected in any regulation of outer space activities. 
Any existing restrictive regulation should be treated with a light touch 
regulatory approach that assures national freedom of action and maximizes 
the industry’s ability to innovate.183 This approach is designed to establish a 
stable environmental for commercial activities. The commercial light touch 
model, applicable to govern the private practices of the commercial space 
industry, would also be applied to governmental military operators.184 Such 
liberal regulation of commercial outer space activities would be extended to 
military “friends and allies.”185 
The 2015 United States Commercial Space Launch Competition Act,186 
is stated as an example of light touch commercial order.187 It expresses current 
United States policy. The Act grants United States citizens the right to keep 
“space resources” as their private property.188 The Act asserts conformation 
181  Presidential Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-2, Streamlining Regulations On Commercial 
Use of Space (May 24, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/space-policy-directive-2-
streamlining-regulations-commercial-use-space/ (mandating the FAA to consider: (i) requiring a single 
license for all types of commercial space flight launch and re-entry operations; and, (ii) replacing prescriptive 
requirements in the commercial space flight launch and re-entry licensing process with performance-based 
criteria); Space Policy Directive-3, supra note 7 (mandating that “the US Government should streamline 
processes and reduce regulatory burdens that could inhibit commercial sector growth and innovation”); see 
also Dr. Scott Pace, Exec. Sec’y, Nat’l Space Council, Keynote Address at the IISL Galloway Space Law 
Symposium (Dec. 13, 2017). 
182  Space Policy Directive-2, supra note 181; Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business 
Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 1970), available at 
http://www.umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf 
183  Friedman, supra note 182. 
184  Sandra Erwin, Infighting over Space Reforms Spills into Public View, SPACENEWS (May 6, 2019), 
https://spacenews.com/on-national-security-infighting-over-space-reforms-spills-into-public-view/. 
185  Pace, supra note 181. 
186  U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, supra note 27. 
187  Id. 
188  Pace, supra note 181. 
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with United States obligations under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty Article VI 
to authorize and supervise non-governmental commercial operators.189 The 
intent of the United States’ space policy is to adopt United States non-binding 
light touch governmental regulations that the Government hopes will become 
adopted by international consensus rather than through new treaty obligations. 
This space policy model firmly rejects the idea that outer space constitutes a 
global commons, or that it is a ‘common good.”190 In granting launch licenses, 
the FAA has been obligated to enforce United States treaty obligations under 
the Outer Space Treaty, in addition to enforcing existing national laws on 
health, safety, and national security, resulting in a balance of interests from 
launch to reentry in addition to the public interest. 
In the Presidential Space Policy Directive 2, the FAA on April 15, 2019 
proposed new space launch regulations, liberalizing United States launch and 
reentry licensing regulations. All launch and reentry regulations will be placed 
in one part—14 CFR Part 450. This would result in licensing regulations 
becoming more flexible. New commercial satellite operators, such as Space-
X and Blue Origin, continue to push for more flexibility. More flexibility 
would keep more safety-related decisions within the industry, basing 
regulations more on operator performance rather than on FAA prescriptive 
requirements. These commercial operators argue that space flight is 
comparable to air travel and thus can be regulated in the methods. However, 
outer space safety is a crucial issue because of the increasing congestion. 
Furthermore, the FAA’s recent safety certification experience with the Boeing 
737 Max 8 may well influence the final outcome of this rulemaking, because 
negligent licensing by a launching state may trigger governmental liability of 
the launching state under the Liability Convention.191 Safety is of fundamental 
value to both military and civilian operations in outer space. 
Under the light touch commercial order approach, there would be 
adequate room for commercial operators to conclude agreements or contracts 
among themselves to regulate their commercial and operational activities with 
each other. Under this scheme, one author suggests that commercial operators 
189  Id.  
190  Id.; see discussion of global commons model infra Part IV.C. 
191  Space Policy Directive-2, supra note 181; see also Sandra Erwin, ULA and Its Commercial 
Competitors in Pitched Fight Over Launch Regulations, SPACENEWS (July 29, 2019), 
https://spacenews.com/ula-and-its-commercial-competitors-in-pitched-fight-over-launch-regulations/; see 
also discussion of Boeing 737 Max 8 supra note 40. See generally C. Johnson, D. Porras, S Hearsey & S 
O’Sullivan, The Curious Case of the Transgressing Tadigrades, THE SPACE REV. (Aug. 26, 2019), 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3783/1?mc_cid=374a0744a4&mc_eid=c460034b2c. 
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could create a system of private law by initially contracting among companies 
regarding all aspects of outer space activities.192Therefore, hypothetically, one 
operator would contract for the launch of space objects; another operator 
would agree to operate the objects in outer space; a third operator would 
purchase the same space object for a different business purpose; and finally, a 
fourth operator would be hired to service the space object while in space. Each 
of these contractors could be of different nationality. Contracts would provide 
which country’s laws govern specific tasks. Blocktrain contracts would 
supplement existing international law. 193  Such agreements would be 
delimited by existing international and national laws, such as national anti-
trust and anti-competition regulations.194  
An argument in favor of this commercial approach would be that it 
would allow maximum room for initiatives of visionaries like Elon Musk, 
who is actively preparing for human exploration and settlement of the planet 
Mars. His commercial company, Space-X, is a main United States link to the 
International Space Station and to exploring Mars. Another such visionary and 
innovator is Amazon’s Chief Executive Officer, Jeff Bezos, 195  whose 
commercial space company initiated reusable space launch technology. This 
company, Blue Origin, is also planning for possible migration of humans to 
other planets as life on Earth becomes more and more difficult. Both Musk 
and Bezos are able and willing to use their own ample resources to fund their 
visions for outer space. Without their visionary activities, some new space 
technology and plans might not come into existence. Furthermore, their 
concentrated focus on outer space development maintains a stability in space 
development that annually appropriated government funds tend to lack.  
The commercial approach would be to the advantage of the states most 
equipped for and interested in commercial exploitation of outer space, such as 
the United States, Luxembourg, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and 
Germany, which have a keen interest in facilitating space activities by non-
192  Brian R. Israel, Space Resources in the Evolutionary Course of Space Lawmaking, 113 AJIL 
UNBOUND 114, 118 (2019). 
193  Id. 
194  Pace, supra note 181; see Israel, supra note 193, at 118. 
195  Jeff Foust, The Cosmic Vision of Jeff Bezos, SPACENEWS (Feb. 2, 2018), https://spacenews.com/the-
cosmic-vision-of-jeff-bezos/; see Space Law is Inadequate for the Boom in Human Activity There, THE 
ECONOMIST (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.economist.com/international/ 
2019/07/18/space-law-is-inadequate-for-the-boom-in-human-activity-there. 
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governmental commercial operators. However, it may conflict with the 
military’s view of its exclusive domain order.196 
2. Evaluation of the Light Touch Commercial Space Order
Commercial placement of thousands of satellites in low Earth orbit may
interfere with scientific observation and exploration of outer space in the same 
way the astronomers complained about Space-X.197 The commercial light 
regulatory approach would maximize innovation and freedom of commercial 
enterprise. The light regulation would be primarily linked to regulation by 
individual states, such as the United States, although all governments would 
be obligated to apply existing international laws and regulations. However, 
making free enterprise the first priority of outer space may conflict with legal 
orders prohibiting appropriation of outer space resources, particularly if 
appropriation is unilateral. Such a prioritization may also conflict with 
environmental orders restricting debris generation. Unregulated uses and 
orbits may interfere with ITU regulation of non-military radiofrequencies and 
related orbital slots. 198  Additionally, another potential problem with light 
touch commercial order is that if commercial activities and consequent light 
touch regulation prioritizes profit over safety of human life, it may interfere 
with outer space navigation by multiple competitors.199 Additionally, outer 
space order based on the profit motive may deviate from the Outer Space 
Treaty’s Article I mandate of sharing benefits among people across the world, 
regardless of their degree of economic and scientific development.200 
The light touch commercial order advocated by the United States tends 
to view outer space in terms of national interests. However, the large space 
industries such as Boeing, Amazon, Space-X, and Airbus are basically 
international companies interested in international commerce. Outer space 
business is inherently international. It would be impossible for one country to 
establish light touch international commercial order for all international space 
commerce.  
As indicated in recent COPUOS discussions, many developing 
countries do not share the United States’ preference for light touch regulation 
196  See supra Part IV.F. 
197  Klotz, Showdown, supra note 39. 
198  See supra Part IV.E. 
199  See supra text accompanying note 40 (discussing Boeing 737 Max 8). 
200  Outer Space Treaty art. I, supra note 6 at 207–08. 
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of outer space commerce.201 Dominion of the developed countries is resented, 
even though companies like One Web link African users to the internet.202 
The light touch commercial approach can conflict with space orders 
based on other values ranging from science, military, environment, safety, and 
international law. The light touch commercial order is primarily linked to 
United States policy. It would have to be internationally coordinated so as not 
to conflict with other national orders. Furthermore, it must be subject to the 
international environmental codes and guidelines. 
H. International Codes and Guidelines for Outer Space Activities
1. Top-down View of Codes and Guidelines
A variety of rules, guidelines, standards and practices have been, and
will continue to be, adopted for activities by states and nongovernmental 
entities in non-sovereign outer space. Examples include the Code of Conduct 
proposed by the European states,203 the 2019 Guidelines for the Long-term 
Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, 204  and the 2007 Space Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines drafted by the Inter-Agency Space Coordination 
Committee (“IADC”), adopted by COPUOS and approved by U.N. General 
Assembly Resolution 62/217.205 These are international management rules in 
process of adoption by groups of individual states to establish common rules 
for their interactions in outer space. The underlying idea behind these rules is 
that it is in the self interest of all parties to be able to use outer space without 
interference from other parties. 
201  See discussion supra Part I.B.   
202  See Martinez & Christensen, supra note 23. 
203  Arms Control, supra note 1, at 150–53. 
204  Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, supra note 21. 
205  See Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE 
AFFAIRS, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.html. See also LYALL & LARSEN, supra 
note 14, at 14–18. 
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2. European Union’s Proposed Code of Conduct for Outer Space206
a. EU Code of Conduct
The EU’s proposed Code of Conduct would establish Rules of the Road
for outer space traffic. By following these rules, operators would know the 
locations of all space objects and be able to predict their movements. Both 
governmental and non-governmental operators would be subject to the rules. 
States, and in turn their authorized non-governmental operators, would agree 
to reduce risky activities that could result in harmful interference with other 
operators. Transparency and space situational awareness would be essential 
parts of the Code of Conduct. A central communications center would be 
established through which operators would be able to ascertain the locations 
and movements of other operators.207 
b. Evaluation
The application of the proposed code to military outer space operations
made states leery of becoming disadvantaged in the outer space arms race. 
Thus, this code is currently not moving toward completion.208 It is mentioned 
in this context because the Code expresses a need for comprehensive 
international order in outer space. It may very well reappear in some other 
form. 
The EU Code needs international acceptance, which was unobtainable. 
To become internationally acceptable, it should be limited to non-military 
activities. Both the EU and the United States expressed approval of such a 
code. The EU Code now needs different additional sponsorship showing that 
such an international code is in the common safety interest of everybody. 
206  EU Proposal for an International Space Code of Conduct, Draft, EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL 
ACTION (Mar. 31, 2014), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/82/about-european-
external-action-service-eeas_en. 
207  Id. 
208  Id. 
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3. The COPUOS Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer
Space Activities209
a. The UN Sustainability Guidelines
The purpose of the UN Sustainability Guidelines is to preserve a
continuing stable, safe, peaceful outer space environment for scientific, 
exploration and economic uses of outer space for all countries. In 2010, a 
COPUOS working group was established to develop guidelines for long term 
sustainability.210 In 2019, COPUOS approved 21 guidelines for adoption by 
the member states. Additional guidelines were discussed but the working 
group could not agree on them.211 The objective of these guidelines is to 
supplement the existing treaty framework, particularly the Outer Space Treaty. 
COPUOS urges the member states to implement the guidelines for use when 
authorizing outer space activities by their non-governmental operators and 
when supervising these operators for compliance with the OST. The 
guidelines will apply to both governmental and non-governmental operators. 
While the guidelines are voluntary and non-binding, states are recommended 
to apply them in their national regulation. The guidelines do not constitute 
new legal authority but must be implemented consistently with existing legal 
obligations under the Outer Space Treaty. The UN Sustainability Guidelines 
for outer space are:212 
A1. To adopt and update national legislation and regulation of 
outer space activities in accordance with OST Art VI and 
consistent with UNGA Resolution 68/74 urging adoption of 
209  Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, supra note 21, at 2 (“The 
long term sustainability of outer space activities is defined as the ability to maintain the conduct of space 
activities indefinitely into the future in a manner that realizes the objectives of equitable access to the benefits 
of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, in order to meet the needs of the present 
generations while preserving the outer space environment for future generations”). 
210  UN COPUOS Working Group on Space Sustainability Concludes its Work with Agreement on 21 
Guidelines, SECURE WORLD FOUND. (Aug. 2, 2018), https://swfound.org/news/all-news/2018/08/un-copuos-
working-group-on-space-sustainability-concludes-its-work-with-agreement-on-21-guidelines. 
211  Id. (COPUOS will continue working on space sustainability through its Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee, which will meet again in February 2019); Press Release, Guidelines for the Long-Term 
Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Adopted, 
UNOOSA (June 22, 2019), http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/informationfor/media/2019-unis-os-518.html. 
212  Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Working Paper of the Scientific and Technical 
Subcomm. on Its Fifty-Sixth Session, Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, 
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/L.366 (2019) (the numbering reflects the numbering used by COPUOS: “A” 
numbers refer to regulation; “B” numbers refer to safety; “C” numbers refer to international cooperation and 
capacity building, and, “D” numbers refer to scientific and technical research and development). 
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national laws and regulations consistent with peaceful 
exploration and use of outer space. 
A2. To minimize the environmental impact of human activities on 
outer space particularly with regard to space debris. 
A3. To actively supervise national activities in outer space so as 
to promote long term sustainability. 
A4. To allocate radiofrequencies and related orbital slots 
equitably, rationally and efficiently in accordance with ITU 
procedures so as to avoid harmful intereferences with 
radiofrequencies. 
A5. To promote effective registration of all space objects. 
B1. To collect safety information about possible collisions and to 
share it widely with other users, perhaps through a safety 
information center maintained by COPUOS. 
B2. To improve accuracy of safety information and to develop 
common international safety standards. 
B3. To promote collection and dissemination of information about 
space debris. 
B4. To perform conjunction assessment during all orbital phases 
of controlled flight. 
B5. To develop practical approaches to pre-launch assessments. 
B6. To monitor and share space weather information. 
B7. To develop international standards and practices that will 
mitigate adverse space weather effects. 
B8. To improve trackability of space objects in particular the 
difficult tracking of small satellite effects. 
B9. To share information about prospective uncontrolled re-entry 
of hazardous space objects, and to assist endangered states. 
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B10. To exercise caution in the use of laser beams affecting low 
earth orbits and to make prelaunch evaluation thereof. 
C1. To promote and facilitate international cooperation in support 
of long-term sustainability of outer space activities. 
C2. To establish procedures for sharing and exchange of 
information about long-term sustainability. 
C3. To support and engage in capacity building in developing 
countries. 
C4. To raise awareness of space activities. 
D1. To support scientific research, development and use of outer 
space. 
D2. To research new ways to manage and reduce space debris. 
The UN Sustainability Guidelines must be constantly updated as space 
technology develops. COPUOS plans to continue updating the guidelines. In 
the larger context, these guidelines are intended to lead to operating rules for 
outer space activities. They will become applicable to exploration of outer 
space and also for administration of outer space resources by national 
governments. 
b. Evaluation
States will tend to follow these guidelines as they adopt domestic
regulation. The appeal of the Sustainability Guidelines is that they represent a 
consensus among the states. Within the guidelines the states have managed to 
agree on common principles, therefore adoption of these guidelines would 
establish international predictability. In the adoption process states would 
streamline and facilitate government oversight. If accepted by many states, 
they could lead to international procedures which would significantly benefit 
all operators, commercial as well as military. 
These guidelines are minimalist, they are voluntary, and they apply 
broadly rather than specifically. The states may implement the guidelines in 
whichever way they choose, if at all. Although they represent a consensus 
among states, the states are free to apply them to the extent the guidelines are 
within their priorities. Thus, the implementation in the form of national laws 
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and regulations, if any, is unlikely to be uniform. Without international 
oversight, the guidelines will not develop into international operational 
practices and therefore may not add significantly to international operating 
rules for space traffic and debris reduction. 
4. Outer Space Guidelines on Space Debris, Space Traffic Management,
and Planetary Defense
The new space age has changed views and attitudes about outer space.
In 1967, at the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty, the environmental 
objective was to conduct outer space activities “with due regard” for the 
activities of other states and to conduct their activities so as to avoid harmful 
contamination as well as adverse changes to the environment of the Earth 
resulting from introduction of extraterrestrial contaminatio213 Extraterrestrial 
contamination was the major environmental concern in 1967, whereas today, 
Earth’s contamination of space is the main concern; an example is the growing 
accumulation of space debris caused by human activities. Space debris alone 
promises eventually to foreclose access to outer space according to the Kessler 
Syndrome, unless there is drastic restriction of old and new space debris.214 
From a space regulatory point of view, it is interesting that the demand for 
debris regulation stems from the demonstrated needs of the users. Space 
debris guidelines are grounds-up regulation rather than top-down.215 
Another environmental concern is traffic crowding, particularly in the 
LEO and GEO orbits. There is more space traffic than originally imagined in 
1967, when OST was adopted, and there will be even more. Satellite operators 
need a safe predictable environment in which to operate. Satellites are 
increasingly exposed to collisions and interferences from other space objects 
including space debris and other spacecrafts. Satellite operators, and in turn 
their governments, are increasingly insisting on operating rules, such as space 
traffic management and space debris mitigating guidelines. The power of 
these rules is that they originate with the users and with individual 
governments making these guidelines mandatory. However, national STM 
213  Outer Space Treaty art. IX, supra note 6, at 209. 
214  Kessler Syndrome, supra note 3. 
215  See Managing, supra note 1, at 748–49. 
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guidelines are not yet the same for all users.216 The next step is to make the 
guidelines into uniform rules for domestic and foreign users.217 
a. COPUOS Space Debris Guidelines218
(i) The Guidelines
Voluntary guidelines specifically for limitation of space debris were
adopted by COPUOS and were approved and recommended by the UN 
General Assembly Resolution 62/217 in 2008 for adoption by individual 
states.219 These guidelines differ from the UN Sustainability Guidelines in that 
the debris guidelines have already been widely adopted by the UN member 
states as mandatory domestic regulations. There are no internationally 
uniform debris regulations, so the debris regulations adopted by the individual 
states may differ from state to state.  
States widely support the voluntary guidelines because space debris is 
such an urgent problem, both for government operators and for non-
governmental operators. 220 However, implementation of the debris guidelines 
varies. For example, in 2019 India, disregarding the COPUOS Space Debris 
Guidelines, intentionally used one of its ASATs to destroy one of its orbiting 
satellites thus significantly increasing the amount of debris in low Earth 
orbit.221 In accordance with the Kessler Syndrome,222 debris in space will 
fragment into more debris as it collides with other debris. Inevitably the space 
debris problem is steadily increasing.223 Nevertheless, the existing COPUOS 
space debris guidelines, with a goal of restraining new debris generation, are 
beneficial to whatever extent they slow down further escalation of the 
problem. 
The 2008 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines approved by the UNGA 
are the following: 
216  COPUOS Space Debris Guidelines, supra note 4; see also Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 4; 
Managing, supra note 1, at 746–50. 
217  Managing, supra note 1, at 284. 
218  COPUOS Space Debris Guidelines, supra note 4; see Solving, supra note 1. 
219  Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 4. 
220  Id. Space debris travels at a speed of 27,000 kilometers an hour. Even small debris can penetrate a 
satellite. Space Law is Inadequate for the Boom in Human Activity There, supra note 195. 
221  See Kessler Syndrome, WIKIPEDIA, supra note 3. 
222  Collision Frequency, supra note 3, at 2637. 
223  Id.  
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1. To limit the amount of debris released during normal
operations;
2. To minimize the potential for break-ups and to cause
minimum space debris when break-up happens;
3. To limit the probability of accidental break-up in outer space;
4. To avoid intentional destruction of space objects and other
harmful activities;
5. To minimize the potential for post-mission break-up resulting
from stored energy by designing spacecraft so as not to break
up and spread debris including fuel;
6. To limit the long-term presence of space craft and launch
vehicle orbital stages in the LEO region at the end of their
mission;
7. To limit the long-term interference of spacecraft and launch
vehicle in the geosynchronous Earth region at the end of their
mission.
(ii) Evaluation
Stricter debris control is urgently needed. It would benefit all
stakeholders. Space debris affects the safety of them all. The existing 
COPUOS space debris guidelines are a step in the right direction. However, 
debris accumulation continues to increase. There are now more than one 
million debris pieces in orbit. Continuing accumulation of debris may 
eventually trigger the Kessler Syndrome precluding access to outer space 
from Earth. In addition to rules governing new debris, old debris accumulation 
must be reduced.224 
The space debris guidelines are actively applied and enforced by major 
space-faring states and constitute a beginning environmental order for outer 
space. They are accepted by individual states as evidenced by United States 
Policy Directive–3 issued on 16 June, 2018. Significantly, the Directive 
recognizes the drastic increase in space debris and that space debris requires 
regulation. It commits the United States to develop better outer space 
224  Id.; Solving, supra note 1, at 484–87. 
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standards and best practices. United States regulatory agencies will develop 
improved standards and best practices in domestic regulatory frameworks and 
use them to help shape international consensus practices and standards.225 
b. Space Traffic Management for Outer Space226
(i) STM
Traffic in outer space is congested. 227  There are currently only
rudimentary operating traffic rules for outer space:228 
1. Spacecraft need interference-free radiofrequencies in order to
navigate in outer space. Governments, through the ITU, are able
to provide interference-free radiofrequencies and related orbits
for individual satellites. Nevertheless, some experimental space
objects may still be launched without prior governmental
coordination;229
2. States and their authorized non-governmental operators are
required by OST Art IX to pay due regard to the space objects of
other nations’ operators;
3. Large objects are currently tracked in outer space by the US Air
Force. 230  While tracking is being improved, the number of
objects tracked is only a very small fraction of the total number
of objects in outer space. Fortunately, the US Air Force is
permitted to share tracking data with civilian operators in the
United States and abroad, but future sharing is subject to possible
restrictions dictated by military secrecy requirements;231
225  Space Policy Directive-3, supra note 7; see also Managing, supra note 1, at 743 and 784. 
226  Space Policy Directive-3, supra note 7. See generally Space Traffic, supra note 1. 
227  See STM, supra note 7. 
228  RADIO REGULATIONS, supra note 36 (through state agencies, such as the FCC, the ITU regulates 
radiofrequencies and related orbits). 
229  However, SWARM Technology was heavily fined by the FCC for launching satellites without 
authorization, see Koren, supra note 150. 
230  The US Air Force is the major tracking institution, and tracking is being improved; but the number 
of objects tracked is only a miniscule fraction of the total number of objects in outer space.  Mike Gruss, 
Good (Space) Fences Make for Good (Orbit) Neighbors, SPACENEWS (Sept. 19, 2016), 
https://spacenews.com/good-space-fences-make-for-good-orbital-neighbors/. Space Traffic, supra note 1, at 
364.  
231  Mike Gruss, supra note 230. 
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4. The possibility of state liability for the activities of non-
governmental operators under the Liability Convention is also a
restraint on governments’ authorization of launches by
irresponsible nongovernmental operators.
There are currently about 4000 satellites in orbit. 232  Commercial 
operators such as Space-X, Blue Origin, One Web, and other operators have 
obtained permissions to launch thousands of mostly small satellites. This 
creates an entirely new traffic situation in outer space. These satellites need to 
be safely launched, operated and deorbited without colliding or interfering 
with each other. They must avoid collisions with existing uncontrolled debris 
in outer space. Small satellites must be deorbited and replaced frequently. 
Thus, there will be much launch and deorbit traffic across orbits of existing 
satellites. 
Compilation and integration of traffic data into a single data system 
from the large number of high-speed functional space objects requires very 
sophisticated data record systems. It requires that the data are freely available. 
The analyzed traffic management data need to be transmitted to the users. 
Some traffic is of military nature and may not be disclosed.233 Nevertheless, 
an international system, as transparent as possible, must be established so that 
space traffic can be safe for all stakeholders. 
The United States Space Policy Directive-3 recognizes that the 
commercial space industry needs space traffic norms in order to operate safely 
and profitably.234 The Directive commits the United States to: 
[d]evelop STM standards and best practices. As the leader in
space, the United States supports the development of operational
standards and best practices to promote safe and responsible
behavior in space. A critical first step in carrying out that goal is
to develop U.S.-led minimum safety standards and best practices
to coordinate space traffic. U.S. regulatory agencies should, as
appropriate, adopt these standards and best practices in domestic
232  See Debra Werner, EU Space Envoy Calls for Satellites to Leave Orbit Soon after Mission Ends, 
SPACENEWS (Oct. 4, 2019), https://spacenews.com/eu-space-envoy-calls-for-satellites-to-leave-orbit-soon-
after-mission-ends/ (noting that there are currently 4,000 satellites in Earth orbit but only 1,800 are 
functioning). 
233  Blount, supra note 139, at 125.  
234  Space Policy Directive-3, supra note 7; see also Managing, supra note 1, at 739, 741–43. 
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regulatory frameworks and use them to inform and help shape 
international consensus practices and standards.235  
Significantly the 2018 United States Policy Directive-3 recognizes that these 
national traffic standards and practices will be most effective if they develop 
into international regulatory standards and practices. 
(ii) Evaluation
Satellites orbit at a much greater speed than airplanes, but a useful
comparison can be made between traffic regulation of the two modes of 
traffic. Space traffic, particularly in LEO,236 can be made safer and more 
efficient. Intense space traffic management would permit more space objects 
to orbit and the traffic would be safer in all orbits. Areas of particular concern 
are: (1) the very busy geostationary orbit of the large communication 
satellites; (2) the secretive military orbits; (3) the global navigation satellites 
systems in mid-earth orbit; and (4) the thousands of small satellites now being 
placed in low earth orbit.237 Space traffic control needs international standards 
and recommended practices like the ICAO flight standards and recommended 
practices for aviation.238 There should be continual day to day STM. As with 
radio frequencies regulated by ITU, and in the aviation and maritime realms, 
space traffic control should apply to the technical aspects of civilian 
activities.239 
Commercial operators and military authorities agree that the huge 
increase in the number of new satellites into outer space creates congestion 
and that traffic management is required. 240 Collisions and interferences must 
be avoided. There are many uncertainties to be resolved. For example, 
simultaneous launches of small satellites in a large group often causes the 
location of some launched satellites to be unknown for weeks.241 Individual 
235  Space Policy Directive-3, supra note 7. 
236  Id.; LEO Constellations, supra note 1, at 30. 
237  Space Policy Directive-3, supra note 7. 
238  Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 
[hereinafter Chicago Convention] (Annex 2, Rules of the Air; Annex 3, Meteorological Service for 
International Air Navigation; Annex 4, Aeronautical Chart; Annex 5, Units of Measurement; Annex 8, 
Airworthiness; Annex 10, Aeronautical Communications; Annex 11, Air Traffic Services; Annex 13, Aircraft 
Accident and Incident Investigations; Annex 15, Aeronautical Information Services). See generally Space 
Traffic, supra note 1. 
239  Chicago Convention, supra note 238 (ICAO and IMO standards and recommended practices). 
240  LEO Constellations, supra note 1, at 30. 
241  Id. 
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countries can direct their own traffic but complete transparency is required to 
avoid space traffic conjunctions with other traffic. We need international 
traffic standards and recommended practices enforced by all states. Space 
traffic will also require more intense tracking and management than is 
presently available.242 
c. Planetary Defense Against Near Earth Objects243
(i) COPUOS Coordination Action Plans
Life on Earth has been close to extinction several times, for example,
when asteroids collided with Earth. One such collision happened 66 million 
years ago.244 It is believed that the collision extinguished the dinosaurs as well 
as 99.9% of all life on Earth.245 The impact fundamentally changed evolution 
on Earth and could be what led to evolution of human beings.246 The Earth 
has been impacted many times since that collision. 247  Several hundred 
thousand asteroids orbit in the asteroid belt between the planets Mars and 
Saturn.248 Asteroids may collide with each other and divert towards the Earth 
becoming classified as Near Earth Objects.249 It is likely that Earth will be 
struck by asteroids again perhaps changing the course of evolution. Humans 
may suddenly have to escape from Earth. Astronomers continuously observe 
those NEOs that they can identify to warn of impending strikes, with the hope 
that we may be able to divert them from striking Earth.250 
Planetary protection cannot yet submit to international guidelines, but 
the situation is so dangerous that cautionary protocols are being developed.251 
242  See STM, supra note 7. 
243  Mike Gruss, supra note 230. See also LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 234–39;. 
244  William J. Broad & Kenneth Chang, Fossil Site Reveals Day That Meteor Hit Earth and, Maybe, 
Wiped Out Dinosaurs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/29/ 
science/dinosaurs-extinction-asteroid.html; Brett Line, Asteroid Impacts: 10 Biggest Known Hits, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 15, 2013), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/2/130214-biggest-asteroid-
impacts-meteorites-space-2012da14/. 
245  Broad & Chang, supra note 244. 
246  Id. 
247  Id. 
248  Id. 
249  Id. 
250  NATIONAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, U.S. NEAR EARTH PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY AND 
ACTION PLAN (June 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/National-Near-Earth-
Object-Preparedness-Strategy-and-Action-Plan-23-pages-1MB.pdf; see REES, supra note 88, at 155 
(speculating on the significance of asteroid strikes on human development); see also Koplow, supra note 90, 
at 158. 
251  See also LYALL AND LARSEN, supra note 10, at 234–39. 
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COPUOS is the forum for international coordination of asteroid warning 
activities. COPUOS has established the voluntary International Asteroid 
Warning Network (“IAWN”) for the purpose of (1) tracking NEOs, (2) 
establishing a clearing house for information, (3) using IAWN as a computer 
information portal, (4) planning for observation of NEOs, (5) recommending 
warning policies, (6) collecting information about possible NEO strike 
consequences, (7) analyzing and communicating consequences of NEO 
strikes, and (8) advising governments.252 
Furthermore, COPUOS established the voluntary Space Mission 
Planning Advisory Group (“SMPAG”) to (1) formulate NEO action plans, (2) 
identify possible NEO impacts, (3) make plans for possible NEO impacts, (4) 
establish communication guidelines, (5) make plans for planetary defense, (6) 
establish decision-making timelines, (7) advise how to avoid NEO impact, (8) 
target NEOs for deflection, (9) advise on use of nuclear power to deflect 
NEOs, and (10) identify action tools.253 
The United States adopted the United States National Near-Earth 
Object Preparedness Strategy and action in 2018. The United States strategy 
includes (1) NEO tracking, (2) forecasting possible strikes, (3) deflection, (4) 
international cooperation, and (5) emergency procedures and protocols for 
response to NEO strikes. 254  Other states have also developed national 
strategies. 
(ii) Evaluation of Planetary
A NEO collided with the Earth as recently as 2013.255 The Earth has
records of many previous impacts and future impacts are certain. The 
COPUOS planetary defensive action plans are voluntary and tentative. 
However, there is no international agreement on joint planetary defense 
against NEOs. 256  Planetary protection is unusually well suited for shared 
responsibility among the States; however, more preparation in COPUOS is 
needed to establish effective international action. In the meantime, some 
individual states are adopting national action plans.  
252  G.A. Res. 68/75, International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Dec. 11, 2013); 
see also LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 234–39. 
253  About Us, INT’L ASTEROID WARNING NETWORK, http://iawn.net/about.shtml. 
254  U.S. NEAR EARTH PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN, supra note 250. 
255  Regulation, supra note 1, at 196; see also Line, supra note 244. 
256  See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 234–39. 
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Most of the planetary defense activities are currently at the national 
level. NEO strikes are inherently international. They move towards Earth from 
non-sovereign outer space. An international action program through 
COPUOS should be adopted. Action should not be delayed until an actual 
NEO appears about to strike because then there might not be time for 
international agreement on action, nor would the necessary tools be available 
to meet the crisis.257 
5. Overall Evaluation of International Codes and Guidelines for Outer
Space258
States have different priorities in outer space. However, outer space is
inherently international. The international codes and guidelines described 
above depend on adoption and implementation by each individual state. 
National implementation too easily results in national differences in what 
should be uniform international behavioral standards and operations. The 
experience with space debris guidelines indicates that although the states 
generally favor international uniformity the individual state regulation will 
often reflect its own priorities and peculiarities. Furthermore, states may 
suddenly have more important priorities. For example, India disregarded the 
accepted space debris guideline when it intentionally destroyed its own 
satellite with an ASAT in 2019, which resulted in a new wave of space 
debris.259 Thus, lack of international uniformity is an inherent weakness of the 
voluntary international codes and guidelines.  
Lack of enforcement is a second weakness of the voluntary codes and 
guidelines. States may need international guidelines on debris and space 
traffic rules, but they may be slow to adopt them and may lack resources to 
enforce the rules. That results in disuniformity in outer space, and ultimately 
leads to lack of transparency and unsafe, dangerous outer space traffic, which 
is contrary to the purpose of the voluntary codes and guidelines.260 
The international guidelines and codes could be easily adopted and 
implemented if they were solely meant for non-military outer space activities. 
This is proven by ITU’s success in arranging radiofrequencies and related 
orbital slots of civilian outer space users. This is also evidenced by the ICAO 
257  LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 234–39. 
258  Managing, supra note 1, at 784. 
259  Foust, supra note 100. 
260  Chicago Convention, supra note 238, arts. 56–57. 
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traffic standards and recommended practices for aviation and the IMO 
standards and practices for maritime activities.261 Like the ITU, aviation and 
maritime standards, the outer space debris and traffic rules are inherently 
technical and should not be burdened by the military baggage. The civilian 
nature of these technical standards and recommended practices will become 
more pronounced as the civilian space traffic swells. These are technical 
standards and should be treated as such. Military uses have been able to 
benefit from the transparency of civilian standards and practices. 
In time, the guidelines and codes will need constant updating by a 
standing body. COPUOS is badly suited for quick updates of guidelines 
because COPUOS only meets once a year. Better would be a standing 
committee like the ICAO Navigation Commission,262 which is composed of 
experts who can act immediately when the need arises. A good example was 
the quick action by the ICAO Navigation Commission to update flight 
standards after the disappearance of a Malaysia Airlines plane in the Indian 
Ocean.263 
A related question is whether COPUOS is the most efficient and 
productive forum for negotiation of codes and guidelines. Would decision-
making in an independent forum for outer space, like ICAO for aviation and 
IMO for maritime traffic, be more effective and productive, more technical 
and less influenced by politics, in particular by military considerations?264 
V. CONCLUSION
A. Complementary and Conflicting Orders in Outer Space
The eight possible legal orders considered in this article overlap to some
extent and conflict with each other. In the examination of each, it is important 
to keep in mind that we are now in a new phase of outer space activity. Besides 
continuing exploration, we are moving in the direction of normalizing outer 
space activities to allow room for and include science experiments, 
communication, earth observation, business, military activities, 
261  Id.; see Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Mar. 6, 1948, 
9 U.S.T. 621, 289 U.N.T.S. 48 
262  Chicago Convention, supra note 238, arts. 56–57. 
263  Larsen, Space Traffic Management Standards, supra note 1, at 384. See also Malaysia Airlines 
Flight 370, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysia_Airlines_Flight_370 (last visited Dec. 17, 
2019). 
264  Space Traffic, supra note 1, at 287. 
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environmental damage and clean-up, and meteorology. There is active interest 
in mining outer space celestial bodies. The sun is considered to be a source of 
renewable energy on Earth in place of coal and oil. The sun produces five 
times more energy than the total demand for energy on the Earth. Solar energy 
could be used to replace oil and coal as energy sources. Inexhaustible Solar 
energy could be used to propel satellites in outer space.265 Plans for Living in 
outer space are being developed. 
B. Coordination of Present and Future Outer Space Orders
The entire Earth-Space infrastructure needs a coordinated legal order.
Overall order in outer space requires each lower order to fit into the larger 
functional order that includes all outer space orders because all the uses of 
outer space are part of a whole. Military security is essential for protection of 
life, but it should not be allowed to appropriate outer space and exclude other 
uses. Likewise, commercial operators must be able to move safely, but 
commercial uses and extraction of resources also cannot be permitted to be 
exclusive of other uses. There is a need to correct imbalances between the 
space powers and the countries that are gradually waking up to the potentials 
of outer space. Otherwise, the “haves” will continue to grow and the “have-
nots” will fall behind. In the long term, we need to prepare for the future uses 
of outer space resources in ways reflecting the interests of all countries, 
irrespective of their degree of economic development. 
The following steps should immediately be taken to improve order 
among the competing interests: (1) international governmental order over 
outer space should preferred over national governmental order because 
international order can even the playing field upon which developing states 
and individual stakeholders compete with economically developed states. (2) 
Future access to outer space is threatened by human activities (debris, traffic 
congestion, military preemptions) so scientists and astronomers should be 
given access to outer space to assure long-term human survival. (3) Safety in 
civilian and military outer space activities should be given priority, meaning 
national and international governmental should prioritze: (a) reduction of 
space debris, which is threatening the existence of all space objects (Kessler 
Syndrome); (b) international space traffic management, including 
international standards and recommended guidelines; (c) continuous safety 
265  See Shannon Stirone, LightSail 2 Unfurls, Next Step Toward Space Travel by Solar Sail, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/23/science/lightsail-solar-sail.html. See generally Paul 
B. Larsen, Current Legal Issues Pertaining to Space Solar Power Systems, 16 SPACE POLICY 139, 139–44
(2000).
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assessment of space launches and flights of space objects by individual 
governments and stakeholders; (d) COPUOS’s focus should be on civilian 
technical safety order, and focus of the UN Disarmament Conference should 
be on safety and limitation of military activities; (f) ITU should carefully 
screen radiofrequency for radio interference that may impede safety of 
satellite navigation; and (g) universal space situational awareness must 
prevail. (4) COPUOS should develop guidelines on uses of outer space 
resources based on the 1994 LOS Protocols to avoid future conflicts. (5) All 
stakeholders should be heard. (6) Ultimately, we need to focus on the far 
future.  
The Milky Way contains more than a billion planets that astronomers 
believe are suitable for human habitation. We need to study and ascertain our 
possibilities for escaping to those planets because our time on planet Earth is 
limited.266 The need to escape our planet may happen sooner than we think, 
and we need to find out what escapes are possible. Now is the time to assure 
a sustainable future. 
266  See generally REES, supra note 88. 
